WEBVTT 00:00.360 --> 00:02.360 Gentlemen , yields back . You and I 00:02.360 --> 00:04.193 recognize a gentle lady from New 00:04.193 --> 00:06.527 Hampshire , Ms . Goodlander . Thank you , 00:06.527 --> 00:08.471 Mr . Chairman and thank you to our 00:08.471 --> 00:10.304 witnesses for being here today , 00:10.304 --> 00:12.471 particularly to you , General Carrilla 00:12.471 --> 00:14.693 and General Langley . I wanna thank you 00:14.693 --> 00:16.638 for your incredible service to our 00:16.638 --> 00:18.860 country , and I will miss you very much 00:18.860 --> 00:21.027 as a new member on this committee . So 00:21.027 --> 00:20.590 thank you for everything you've done , 00:20.920 --> 00:23.142 General Corilla . I wanna take you back 00:23.142 --> 00:25.142 to 2022 , your confirmation hearing 00:25.142 --> 00:28.110 when you testified that . Iran , the 00:28.110 --> 00:30.190 Iranian regime is the number one 00:30.190 --> 00:32.468 destabilizing force in the Middle East . 00:32.468 --> 00:34.709 Is that still still remains the number 00:34.709 --> 00:37.042 one malign influence in the Middle East ? 00:37.590 --> 00:39.701 Thank you for that . You know , you , 00:39.701 --> 00:41.812 you , in your written testimony , you 00:41.812 --> 00:43.979 testified that Iran's nuclear threat , 00:43.979 --> 00:46.830 um , it's best chance at restoring 00:46.830 --> 00:49.052 deterrence and imposing its will on the 00:49.052 --> 00:51.163 region is its nuclear threat . And he 00:51.163 --> 00:53.330 also testified that Iran has virtually 00:53.330 --> 00:55.650 doubled its enrichment capacity in the 00:55.650 --> 00:57.594 past 6 months , which is extremely 00:57.594 --> 00:59.889 alarming , I think to everybody on this 00:59.889 --> 01:02.000 committee , and I just want to say at 01:02.000 --> 01:04.056 the outset that Congress is , we are 01:04.056 --> 01:06.000 committed on a bipartisan basis to 01:06.000 --> 01:08.222 taking action on this issue . I'm proud 01:08.222 --> 01:10.278 to be , uh , supporting the Enhanced 01:10.278 --> 01:12.278 Iran Sanctions Act of 2025 , and we 01:12.278 --> 01:14.510 welcome . Uh , the , the Pentagon's 01:14.510 --> 01:17.110 help in in advising Congress as we 01:17.110 --> 01:19.166 think through every tool that can be 01:19.166 --> 01:21.389 used to prevent Iran from obtaining a 01:21.389 --> 01:23.556 nuclear weapon . I , I wanna ask you , 01:23.556 --> 01:25.790 General , about , um , as many of my 01:25.790 --> 01:28.269 colleagues have , uh , the other pillar 01:28.269 --> 01:30.339 of the threat Iran poses its funding 01:30.339 --> 01:32.450 for terrorist groups and particularly 01:32.450 --> 01:35.790 the Houthis , um , so last month the 01:35.790 --> 01:38.349 president reached a ceasefire agreement . 01:38.790 --> 01:41.750 Uh , with the Houthis , the terrorist 01:41.750 --> 01:43.870 organization , the Houthis . Um , I 01:43.870 --> 01:46.709 wanted to ask you the goal of that 01:46.709 --> 01:48.931 ceasefire agreement and , and the terms 01:48.931 --> 01:51.150 of the agreement . So when the 01:51.150 --> 01:53.372 president gave the mission to CENTCOM , 01:53.389 --> 01:55.940 it was a very specific mission on March 01:55.940 --> 01:58.660 10th , he said , I want the Houthis to 01:58.660 --> 02:00.830 quit shooting at our ships . That was 02:00.830 --> 02:03.629 the mission that was given to us for 51 02:03.629 --> 02:05.851 days we pounded the Houthis . They were 02:05.851 --> 02:08.350 screaming to all of our partners in the 02:08.350 --> 02:11.229 region to include the Omanis to get the 02:11.229 --> 02:13.340 Americans to stop pounding them . And 02:13.340 --> 02:15.285 so they came and said we will quit 02:15.285 --> 02:17.285 shooting at you if you quit we will 02:17.285 --> 02:17.240 stop shooting at you if you quit 02:17.240 --> 02:19.462 shooting at us that met the president's 02:19.462 --> 02:21.462 goal . So stop shooting at American 02:21.462 --> 02:23.684 ships . That was the specific goal that 02:23.684 --> 02:25.851 was given to me . Understood . And the 02:25.851 --> 02:27.518 goal is to restore freedom of 02:27.518 --> 02:29.684 navigation in this important . part of 02:29.684 --> 02:31.804 the world where so much of global 02:31.804 --> 02:33.860 commercial shipping depends upon the 02:33.860 --> 02:35.804 freedom of navigation . 30% of all 02:35.804 --> 02:37.915 container traffic . So has commercial 02:37.915 --> 02:40.137 shipping resumed ? So that will be more 02:40.137 --> 02:41.915 of a lagging indicator when the 02:41.915 --> 02:43.915 insurance rates come down . Um , we 02:43.915 --> 02:46.137 just did a freedom of navigation with 4 02:46.137 --> 02:48.535 warships over the last week . Nothing 02:48.535 --> 02:50.757 was shot at them . We also had multiple 02:50.757 --> 02:53.524 other countries frigates and the UK 02:53.524 --> 02:55.800 destroyer went through there . Um , I 02:55.800 --> 02:58.022 think you will see over time as long as 02:58.022 --> 03:00.369 the conditions exist , deterrence is 03:00.369 --> 03:02.850 always temporal , um , as long as those 03:02.850 --> 03:04.794 conditions exist and the insurance 03:04.794 --> 03:06.961 rates come back down , it's a two week 03:06.961 --> 03:09.017 faster transit to go through the Red 03:09.017 --> 03:11.183 Sea and the Suez than to go around the 03:11.183 --> 03:13.183 Cape of Good Hope . But right now a 03:13.183 --> 03:15.294 shipping industry is looking at it as 03:15.294 --> 03:17.628 long . As the insurance rates stay high , 03:17.628 --> 03:16.994 they will choose to go a different 03:16.994 --> 03:19.161 route and so that's gonna be a lagging 03:19.161 --> 03:21.272 indicator . So how long do you expect 03:21.272 --> 03:23.494 it will take for commercial shipping to 03:23.494 --> 03:25.716 resume ? I think you'll see us start to 03:25.716 --> 03:27.716 some other US flagged ships , and I 03:27.716 --> 03:29.827 think others will start to go through 03:29.827 --> 03:31.994 there as well over time as long as the 03:31.994 --> 03:34.300 conditions exist . Thank you , General . 03:34.460 --> 03:37.050 Well , as you know well , the cost of 03:37.050 --> 03:39.419 this lagging indicator is very real for 03:39.419 --> 03:41.752 the American people , and Mr . Chairman , 03:41.752 --> 03:44.030 I'd like to enter into the record , um , 03:44.030 --> 03:47.259 an article uh dated June 5th , Red Sea 03:47.259 --> 03:49.380 Passage remains remains a no go for 03:49.380 --> 03:51.820 shipping despite US action . Without 03:51.820 --> 03:53.876 objection , so ordered . Thank you , 03:54.419 --> 03:56.949 General , I , you know , I . I want to 03:56.949 --> 04:00.270 ask you about uh well first of all , so 04:00.270 --> 04:02.509 our goal was to to protect American 04:02.509 --> 04:04.731 ships . Our goal was not to protect our 04:04.731 --> 04:06.565 ally Israel and we are seeing an 04:06.565 --> 04:08.731 escalation in the conflict between the 04:08.731 --> 04:10.919 Houthis and our ally Israel . Um , 04:11.029 --> 04:13.196 you've testified to some of the things 04:13.196 --> 04:15.362 we can do to help mitigate that threat 04:15.362 --> 04:17.585 to our allies . I , um , but I , I just 04:17.585 --> 04:19.751 want to say for the record that this , 04:20.334 --> 04:22.535 you have said well that this is a 04:22.535 --> 04:24.591 threat that's metastasizing . It's a 04:24.591 --> 04:26.757 regional scourge and the United States 04:26.757 --> 04:28.868 cannot give up on this . We are still 04:28.868 --> 04:30.868 protecting Israel though we have TA 04:30.868 --> 04:32.868 battery there that is shooting down 04:32.868 --> 04:34.868 Houthi missiles , and we shoot down 04:34.868 --> 04:36.813 Houthi UAVs that are going towards 04:36.813 --> 04:38.868 Israel . Thank you , General . I was 04:38.868 --> 04:41.035 very interested and I'll be submitting 04:41.035 --> 04:43.146 more questions for the record in what 04:43.146 --> 04:45.368 you said . Um , about what CEO could do 04:45.368 --> 04:47.591 to help deliver humanitarian assistance 04:47.591 --> 04:49.591 to Gaza , can you , can you tell us 04:49.591 --> 04:51.850 what resources CEO has to bear , uh , 04:51.859 --> 04:53.970 towards what I think we can all agree 04:53.970 --> 04:56.026 is a really important mission . So I 04:56.026 --> 04:58.137 think that the biggest resources that 04:58.137 --> 04:59.803 SENCOM can assist with is the 04:59.803 --> 05:02.140 groundlock is where how you you you 05:02.140 --> 05:04.299 move large quantities of that we 05:04.299 --> 05:06.521 assisted the Jordanians in scanning all 05:06.521 --> 05:08.910 of their . Um , trucks before they went 05:08.910 --> 05:11.109 in and that met the Israeli security 05:11.109 --> 05:13.470 concerns of any trucks going in and we 05:13.470 --> 05:15.581 deliveries time expired . Chair and I 05:15.581 --> 05:17.748 recognize a gentleman from Guam . uh , 05:17.748 --> 05:20.026 Mr . Molan , thank you , Mr . Chairman . 05:20.026 --> 05:22.429 I thank you all for your participation 05:22.429 --> 05:25.049 today . Yeah , especially what what you 05:25.049 --> 05:27.216 have in front of you and over the last 05:27.216 --> 05:29.327 18 months from the administration and 05:29.327 --> 05:31.970 SENCOM and AFICO and you've engaged and 05:31.970 --> 05:34.000 you sustained some high tempo 05:34.000 --> 05:36.209 operations involving missile defense 05:36.209 --> 05:38.850 and rapid force protection . You can 05:38.850 --> 05:42.320 tested logistics and you counter proxy 05:42.320 --> 05:44.850 engagement , so many of which reflect 05:44.850 --> 05:46.970 the type of challenges we're 05:46.970 --> 05:49.649 anticipating in the potential 05:49.649 --> 05:53.399 Indo-Pacific conflict . So lessons 05:53.399 --> 05:56.029 learned I'd like to hear from each of 05:56.029 --> 05:58.700 you , uh , from this kinetic operations 05:58.700 --> 06:00.533 that you've been doing , whether 06:00.533 --> 06:02.850 whether it be from Centicom's counter , 06:03.089 --> 06:06.380 uh , Houthi maritime strikes or AFRO's 06:06.380 --> 06:09.059 experience in the disperse operations 06:09.059 --> 06:11.619 and low access environments , what 06:11.619 --> 06:14.260 lessons are being actively incorporated . 06:14.950 --> 06:17.359 Into strategic planning for high-end 06:17.359 --> 06:19.769 fight in the Indo-Pacific , uh , Ms . 06:19.779 --> 06:21.890 Thompson , if we can start first with 06:21.890 --> 06:24.450 you please . Thank you , Congressman . 06:24.480 --> 06:26.536 I think it's an incredibly important 06:26.536 --> 06:28.258 question . Um , I'll leave the 06:28.258 --> 06:30.147 operational details to to General 06:30.147 --> 06:32.147 Langley and General Corolla , but I 06:32.147 --> 06:33.980 would say , um , one of the most 06:33.980 --> 06:33.519 important things that that we're 06:33.519 --> 06:35.686 watching is certainly , uh , strategic 06:35.686 --> 06:37.575 waterways and the ability to flow 06:37.575 --> 06:39.297 forces into the Indo-Pacific . 06:39.297 --> 06:41.463 Obviously , uh , freedom of navigation 06:41.463 --> 06:43.686 for US military vessels through the BAM 06:43.686 --> 06:45.797 and the Red Sea , um , is critical to 06:45.797 --> 06:45.239 that effort . So I would just highlight 06:45.239 --> 06:47.406 that as one of the big takeaways and , 06:47.406 --> 06:49.517 and one of the strategic choke points 06:49.517 --> 06:51.739 that's very important to , to make sure 06:51.739 --> 06:54.072 we have control over . General , please . 06:54.072 --> 06:56.017 Yeah , so I think between both the 06:56.017 --> 06:58.079 Iranian attacks on Israel as well as 06:58.079 --> 07:01.519 our uh the Houthi attacks on our naval 07:01.519 --> 07:03.880 forces we have learned a lot that are 07:03.880 --> 07:06.047 applicable and we passed these back to 07:06.047 --> 07:08.269 the big navy , big air force , uh , the 07:08.269 --> 07:11.029 army as well um software is a weapon 07:11.359 --> 07:13.559 our ability to do combined joint all 07:13.559 --> 07:16.010 domain command and control , um , the 07:16.010 --> 07:18.177 things that we are doing with software 07:18.177 --> 07:20.510 is amazing . Um , we have advanced that . 07:20.510 --> 07:22.510 We have engineers every day making 07:22.510 --> 07:24.788 improvements on our ability to do that . 07:24.788 --> 07:26.954 It's a war fighting headquarters . The 07:26.954 --> 07:29.177 things that we are doing with ballistic 07:29.177 --> 07:31.066 missile defense , the software is 07:31.066 --> 07:33.288 changing based on what we are seeing on 07:33.288 --> 07:35.232 the battlefield . The same thing I 07:35.232 --> 07:37.343 would tell you as it comes to counter 07:37.343 --> 07:39.454 UAS as well . We are making . Changes 07:39.454 --> 07:41.621 to the navy software on the spy radars 07:41.621 --> 07:43.732 based on what we're seeing . It's the 07:43.732 --> 07:45.788 first time in the history of warfare 07:45.788 --> 07:45.674 that anti-ship ballistic missiles have 07:45.674 --> 07:48.234 been used against ships . Um , I would 07:48.234 --> 07:50.234 remind you that the , uh , uh , the 07:50.234 --> 07:52.456 Truman spent 51 days in the the longest 07:52.456 --> 07:54.345 sustained period of combat for an 07:54.345 --> 07:56.456 aircraft carrier since World War II , 07:56.456 --> 07:59.029 and they perform marvelously . Thank 07:59.029 --> 08:02.350 you , General . Thank you Congressman 08:02.350 --> 08:04.040 for that question and from my 08:04.040 --> 08:06.720 perspective , um , in the operational 08:06.720 --> 08:08.664 sense , I look at it as supporting 08:08.664 --> 08:10.331 three different , uh , combat 08:10.331 --> 08:12.164 commanders and to include , uh , 08:12.164 --> 08:14.109 CENTCOM and , uh , in their global 08:14.109 --> 08:16.164 integrated plan against , uh , their 08:16.164 --> 08:18.442 foes , especially Iran , and then , uh , 08:18.442 --> 08:20.559 and , and even , uh , uh , UCO and 08:20.559 --> 08:22.790 their , their , their global plan as , 08:22.839 --> 08:25.119 as well as in the Paycom , uh , and on 08:25.119 --> 08:27.200 this map here that you . See the 08:27.200 --> 08:30.070 strategic choke points , uh , as far as 08:30.070 --> 08:32.292 AFRICO and what we're charged to do and 08:32.292 --> 08:34.403 supporting those of respective combat 08:34.403 --> 08:36.514 commanders in support of their , uh , 08:36.514 --> 08:38.626 global plans is to be able to keep us 08:38.626 --> 08:41.080 at phase zero , phase zero of deter , 08:41.400 --> 08:43.520 and being able to er and and keep a 08:43.520 --> 08:45.576 free flow of commerce and freedom of 08:45.576 --> 08:47.520 action around us so we work , uh , 08:47.520 --> 08:49.631 through our partners . A number of uh 08:49.631 --> 08:51.576 countries across the Mareb for and 08:51.576 --> 08:54.330 every exercise has that teed up as far 08:54.330 --> 08:57.650 as a objective to how we do that uh 08:57.650 --> 08:59.872 with shared objectives , shared intel , 08:59.872 --> 09:02.094 and , uh , and common common objectives 09:02.094 --> 09:03.817 I should say , uh , with other 09:03.817 --> 09:05.928 countries , and that's an enabler for 09:05.928 --> 09:08.150 us in my support support plans to those 09:08.150 --> 09:10.640 respective combat commanders . Thank 09:10.640 --> 09:12.807 you , General , uh , General Corella , 09:12.807 --> 09:14.918 and most of my hearings I'm always an 09:14.918 --> 09:17.084 advocate for the army , right , in the 09:17.084 --> 09:19.251 Indo-ACO area especially , but today I 09:19.251 --> 09:21.640 wanna advocate for the Navy's role in 09:21.640 --> 09:23.807 SENCOMM . So how has the United States 09:23.807 --> 09:26.280 participated in this multinational 09:26.280 --> 09:29.049 maritime task force to counter both 09:29.049 --> 09:31.159 state and non-state actors within . 09:31.739 --> 09:33.517 Your area of operation , so I'm 09:33.517 --> 09:35.683 incredibly proud of the uh the sailors 09:35.683 --> 09:37.850 in our navy and what they've been able 09:37.850 --> 09:39.739 to accomplish . So when I look at 09:39.739 --> 09:41.795 CENCOM , it has 3 of the 8 strategic 09:41.795 --> 09:43.850 choke points in the world , um , and 09:43.850 --> 09:46.072 what our navy has been able to do to be 09:46.072 --> 09:48.406 able to secure those has been fantastic . 09:48.406 --> 09:50.628 I mean they have really , when you look 09:50.628 --> 09:52.739 at what they've done both against the 09:52.739 --> 09:54.961 Houthis and then in the interdiction of 09:54.961 --> 09:57.239 other uh things coming into the region , 09:57.239 --> 09:59.295 they've done a fantastic job . Thank 09:59.295 --> 09:58.700 you so much . Thank you for your 09:58.700 --> 10:00.756 service to the nation . I appreciate 10:00.756 --> 10:03.033 you all , Mr . Chairman . I yield back . 10:03.033 --> 10:04.978 Gentleman , yields back here and I 10:04.978 --> 10:07.200 recognize the gentleman from Illinois , 10:07.200 --> 10:06.539 Mr . Sorenson . Thank you , Mr . 10:06.690 --> 10:08.523 Chairman . Uh , good morning and 10:08.523 --> 10:10.579 welcome to General Corella , General 10:10.579 --> 10:12.539 Langley , and Ms . Thompson . I 10:12.539 --> 10:14.761 especially want to thank , uh , the two 10:14.761 --> 10:16.761 generals here today , uh , for your 10:16.761 --> 10:18.983 many years of service , your dedication 10:18.983 --> 10:21.206 to our nation . Um , since this will be 10:21.206 --> 10:23.261 the last time that you appear before 10:23.261 --> 10:25.206 our committee , you have worn your 10:25.206 --> 10:27.317 uniform so proudly , and your country 10:27.317 --> 10:29.483 will always be grateful of that . Um , 10:29.483 --> 10:31.595 both sides of the aisle agree today , 10:31.595 --> 10:33.710 um , that we must continue to improve 10:33.710 --> 10:35.821 support to service members as well as 10:35.821 --> 10:37.932 our standing around the world . But I 10:37.932 --> 10:41.340 must say that my constituents and I are 10:41.340 --> 10:43.396 still very angry , uh , that our men 10:43.396 --> 10:45.780 and women in the CEO theater were put 10:45.780 --> 10:48.020 at risk by the signal mess with 10:48.020 --> 10:49.964 Secretary Hegseth , Vice President 10:49.964 --> 10:52.131 Vance and other senior members of this 10:52.131 --> 10:54.460 administration . Our brave service 10:54.460 --> 10:58.289 members should never have to worry 10:58.460 --> 11:01.500 that our own leaders are giving enemies 11:01.500 --> 11:04.719 our mission secrets . As we've seen 11:04.719 --> 11:06.830 with the Houthis , we need to be able 11:06.830 --> 11:09.559 to properly protect ourselves , uh , 11:09.570 --> 11:11.514 from drones and , and we should be 11:11.514 --> 11:13.514 outfitting our own war fighter with 11:13.514 --> 11:15.514 drones . The Rock Island Arsenals , 11:15.514 --> 11:17.459 Joint manufacturing and Technology 11:17.459 --> 11:19.849 Center , 3D prints , drones that then 11:19.849 --> 11:21.905 get out . Outfitted with the sensors 11:21.905 --> 11:23.627 and the systems needed for our 11:23.627 --> 11:25.682 important missions , I think this is 11:25.682 --> 11:27.905 crucially needed , but to both generals 11:27.905 --> 11:29.905 today . Can you talk about where we 11:29.905 --> 11:32.210 need to be going in terms of both our 11:32.210 --> 11:34.690 unmanned air systems and counter UAS 11:34.690 --> 11:37.010 capabilities in our regions ? If I 11:37.010 --> 11:38.788 could just jump on the additive 11:38.788 --> 11:40.954 manufacturing 3D printing , so we have 11:40.954 --> 11:43.010 an innovation task force out there . 11:43.010 --> 11:45.066 One of them is Task Force 39 , which 11:45.066 --> 11:47.399 has an additive manufacturing in Kuwait . 11:47.399 --> 11:49.288 We use that for both polymers and 11:49.288 --> 11:51.510 metallic additive manufacturing . We'll 11:51.510 --> 11:53.732 print parts , get that back , get a get 11:53.732 --> 11:55.788 a system back up until that OEM part 11:55.788 --> 11:57.899 can come in . We do that on a routine 11:57.899 --> 12:00.066 basis . We are 3D printing drones down 12:00.066 --> 12:02.260 in Task Force 99 down in , uh , uh , 12:02.270 --> 12:04.437 Qatar , and they do over these small . 12:04.437 --> 12:06.729 All , um , a treatable drones we slap 12:06.729 --> 12:08.840 some cameras on them and we use those 12:08.840 --> 12:10.840 very effectively as well so I think 12:10.840 --> 12:12.785 this is , you know , when you talk 12:12.785 --> 12:14.951 counter UAS though a big part of it is 12:14.951 --> 12:17.118 the detect and I think we have to do a 12:17.118 --> 12:19.118 better job to be able to detect and 12:19.118 --> 12:21.285 that is something that we've made some 12:21.285 --> 12:23.173 some recommendations on as well . 12:23.173 --> 12:25.118 General Langley . Now I'll just go 12:25.118 --> 12:27.229 ahead and state that uh my buddy here 12:27.229 --> 12:29.340 Coria uh in SENCO region has been the 12:29.340 --> 12:31.710 lead uh lead as far as , uh , uh , 12:31.719 --> 12:33.941 evolving technology to counter drones , 12:33.941 --> 12:36.052 uh , because what happens in SENCOM , 12:36.169 --> 12:38.447 uh , will eventually happen in Africom . 12:38.447 --> 12:40.669 So , uh , we've been following his lead 12:40.669 --> 12:42.280 in the in the technology and 12:42.280 --> 12:44.391 experimentation and , uh , we've been 12:44.391 --> 12:46.280 leveraging that , uh , within the 12:46.280 --> 12:48.447 Africom region . Thank you , sir . The 12:48.447 --> 12:50.558 new regime in Syria certainly changes 12:50.558 --> 12:52.725 the landscape of the Middle East . You 12:52.725 --> 12:54.613 know , I'm hopeful that this will 12:54.613 --> 12:56.836 really diminish Iran's influence in the 12:56.836 --> 12:59.002 region and lessen Russia's foothold in 12:59.002 --> 13:01.169 the Middle East . To General Corella , 13:01.169 --> 13:03.280 with our approach to Syria changing , 13:03.280 --> 13:05.447 where do you see things headed today ? 13:05.447 --> 13:07.619 And what opportunities and challenges 13:07.619 --> 13:09.508 do you see going forward ? So the 13:09.508 --> 13:11.730 opportunities are , are significant . I 13:11.730 --> 13:13.730 think I see a lot of upside . I see 13:13.730 --> 13:16.008 little downside for engaging right now . 13:16.008 --> 13:17.897 Ambassador Tom Bark , he's the US 13:17.897 --> 13:19.786 ambassador to Turkey but also the 13:19.786 --> 13:21.841 special envoy to Syria . I talked to 13:21.841 --> 13:24.200 him often . Um , he is at the table . I 13:24.200 --> 13:26.619 think we were waited a little too long 13:26.619 --> 13:28.675 to come to the table , um , with the 13:28.675 --> 13:30.786 fall of Assad back in December . Um , 13:30.786 --> 13:32.952 we're now there and we're , we're able 13:32.952 --> 13:35.119 to engage and be able to shape the way 13:35.119 --> 13:37.286 forward . I think that's a very , very 13:37.286 --> 13:39.508 positive thing . One of the things that 13:39.508 --> 13:41.230 I worry about with the current 13:41.230 --> 13:40.659 administration is how we're handling 13:40.659 --> 13:42.881 the relationships that we have with our 13:42.881 --> 13:44.992 allies around the world , our ability 13:44.992 --> 13:46.770 to forge . New partnerships and 13:46.770 --> 13:48.881 friendships , you know , building and 13:48.881 --> 13:50.937 maintaining these partnerships is so 13:50.937 --> 13:52.826 crucial to our own safety and our 13:52.826 --> 13:54.659 interests and as General Corella 13:54.659 --> 13:56.770 mentioned in your written statement , 13:56.770 --> 13:59.048 we can't take our partners for granted . 13:59.048 --> 14:01.270 Um , can you speak to the importance of 14:01.270 --> 14:03.492 our allies in the region and what we in 14:03.492 --> 14:05.603 Congress need to do to support them ? 14:05.603 --> 14:07.826 Well , I think a big part of it is , is 14:07.826 --> 14:10.048 being there for them . I've , I've been 14:10.048 --> 14:12.270 to the region 45 times . You have to be 14:12.270 --> 14:14.492 there . You have to sit down . You have 14:14.492 --> 14:16.548 a meal together . And that's how you 14:16.548 --> 14:18.770 build a friendship and a relationship . 14:18.770 --> 14:20.992 Um , I talked to the Chads almost every 14:20.992 --> 14:23.215 single day . I'm talking to a different 14:23.215 --> 14:22.900 Chad multiple chiefs of defense . I'm 14:22.900 --> 14:25.299 sorry , every single day I'm talking to 14:25.299 --> 14:27.299 several of them , um , when they're 14:27.299 --> 14:29.632 sending you pictures of their grandkids , 14:29.632 --> 14:29.400 you know , you're , you know you're 14:29.400 --> 14:31.539 part of the family , and , and to be 14:31.539 --> 14:33.650 able to do that though , what they're 14:33.650 --> 14:35.761 asking of us is , hey , one , are you 14:35.761 --> 14:37.928 gonna be there for us ? And the answer 14:37.928 --> 14:40.095 is yes , but it's the foreign military 14:40.095 --> 14:41.761 sales is their single biggest 14:41.761 --> 14:43.761 frustration . That they have on the 14:43.761 --> 14:45.872 time to deliver , they have the means 14:45.872 --> 14:48.039 to purchase . It's the time to deliver 14:48.039 --> 14:50.206 that equipment that they're asking for 14:50.206 --> 14:52.317 and that's where I think we can amend 14:52.317 --> 14:54.595 40% of all foreign military sales , um , 14:54.595 --> 14:54.489 in the world in the CENTCOM region , 14:54.549 --> 14:56.605 and I think we can do a better job . 14:56.605 --> 14:58.716 Thank you , gentlemen , both for your 14:58.716 --> 15:00.549 service , and we appreciate your 15:00.549 --> 15:02.382 dedication to our country , Mr . 15:02.382 --> 15:02.349 Chairman , I yell back . Gentlemen , Y 15:02.349 --> 15:04.238 is back . Chair , I recognize the 15:04.238 --> 15:06.349 gentleman from Texas , Mr . Latrell . 15:06.349 --> 15:08.571 Thank you , Mr . Chairman . Gentlemen , 15:08.571 --> 15:08.070 thank you for coming today , and I'd 15:08.070 --> 15:10.126 like to thank everyone in in uniform 15:10.126 --> 15:12.292 today as well as our veterans that are 15:12.292 --> 15:14.181 in the . In the room Uh , General 15:14.181 --> 15:16.348 Carrelli , you , you talked about ISIS 15:16.348 --> 15:18.070 in Afghanistan in your opening 15:18.070 --> 15:20.292 statement . Um , I'd like a little deep 15:20.292 --> 15:22.626 dive if you don't mind . Sure . Alright , 15:22.780 --> 15:25.619 so ISIS Khorasan , perhaps one of the 15:25.619 --> 15:27.675 most active in trying to do external 15:27.675 --> 15:29.786 plots globally to include against the 15:29.786 --> 15:32.179 homeland , um , right now what we saw 15:32.179 --> 15:34.900 is the Taliban , um , in going after 15:34.900 --> 15:37.067 ISIS-K . They hate each other , pushed 15:37.067 --> 15:39.233 a lot of them into the tribal areas on 15:39.233 --> 15:41.460 the Afghan-Pakistan border through a 15:41.460 --> 15:44.330 phenomenal partnership with Pakistan . 15:44.659 --> 15:46.849 They have gone after ISIS Khorasan , 15:47.179 --> 15:49.900 killing dozens of them through a 15:49.900 --> 15:52.219 relationship we have with them . In 15:52.219 --> 15:54.052 providing intelligence they have 15:54.052 --> 15:57.659 captured at least 5 ISIS Khorasan high 15:57.659 --> 16:00.210 value individuals . They extradited 16:00.210 --> 16:02.330 back Jafar , who was one of the key 16:02.330 --> 16:04.219 individuals behind the Abbey Gate 16:04.219 --> 16:06.108 bombing , and the first person he 16:06.108 --> 16:08.163 called , uh , uh , Chief of the Army 16:08.163 --> 16:10.386 staff when there was me and said , I've 16:10.386 --> 16:12.497 caught him . I'm willing to extradite 16:12.497 --> 16:11.929 him back to the United States . Please 16:11.929 --> 16:14.040 tell the Secretary of Defense and the 16:14.040 --> 16:16.151 President . So we are seeing Pakistan 16:16.369 --> 16:18.369 with with limited intelligence that 16:18.369 --> 16:20.313 we're providing them go after them 16:20.313 --> 16:22.258 using their means to do that . And 16:22.258 --> 16:24.425 we're seeing an effect on ISIS courses 16:24.425 --> 16:26.647 at the same point they're continuing to 16:26.647 --> 16:28.869 move around . Sometimes they'll try and 16:28.869 --> 16:31.036 go back into Afghanistan . We have the 16:31.036 --> 16:31.020 means to be able to collect , but for 16:31.020 --> 16:33.242 the most part right now they're hanging 16:33.242 --> 16:35.260 out right in that border area of 16:35.260 --> 16:37.482 Pakistan and I would also tell you that 16:37.482 --> 16:39.700 I mean since 2024 , the beginning . 16:39.989 --> 16:43.299 Pakistan held over 1000 terrorist 16:43.299 --> 16:45.630 attacks in the western area killing 16:45.630 --> 16:48.150 about 700 security and civilians and 16:48.150 --> 16:50.229 2500 wounded . They're in an active 16:50.229 --> 16:52.590 counterterrorism fight right now , and 16:52.590 --> 16:54.757 they have been a phenomenal partner in 16:54.757 --> 16:56.868 the counterterrorism world . It seems 16:56.868 --> 16:59.034 like does it seem like they're scaling 16:59.034 --> 17:01.090 down or scaling up ? So I think from 17:01.090 --> 17:03.280 ISIS Khorasan they got hit very , very 17:03.280 --> 17:06.030 hard over the last several months , um , 17:06.040 --> 17:08.151 and so they're , I , I would tell you 17:08.151 --> 17:10.318 right now they're at a low point right 17:10.318 --> 17:12.096 now . What we're getting out of 17:12.096 --> 17:14.318 interrogation and exploitation has been 17:14.318 --> 17:14.199 significant , but remember these are 17:14.199 --> 17:16.088 the same individuals that did the 17:16.088 --> 17:18.421 crocus Music City Hall attack in Moscow . 17:18.560 --> 17:20.727 They did the attack in Kerman , Iran , 17:20.727 --> 17:22.838 and they've attempted other attacks , 17:22.838 --> 17:24.560 and there's actually ties in a 17:24.560 --> 17:26.782 classified setting that I could talk in 17:26.782 --> 17:29.004 terms of the homeland . What we have to 17:29.004 --> 17:28.800 do not to go back to that place would 17:28.800 --> 17:31.339 be amazing . That's why we need to , uh , 17:31.469 --> 17:33.750 if I could please , we have to have a 17:33.750 --> 17:35.750 relationship with Pakistan and with 17:35.750 --> 17:37.972 India . I do not believe it is a binary 17:37.972 --> 17:40.306 switch that we can't have one with , uh , 17:40.306 --> 17:42.528 Pakistan if we have a relationship with 17:42.528 --> 17:44.750 India . We should look at the merits of 17:44.750 --> 17:44.550 the relationship for the positives that 17:44.550 --> 17:47.790 it has . General Langley , 17:48.079 --> 17:51.560 with in regards to AFRO , it , it seems 17:51.560 --> 17:53.839 as if Russia more or less has Africa 17:53.839 --> 17:56.000 landlocked , uh , well I'm looking at 17:56.000 --> 17:59.550 the map here . Can you give me a kind 17:59.550 --> 18:01.717 of a high level briefing when it comes 18:01.717 --> 18:03.661 to Tunisia , Algeria , Libya , the 18:03.661 --> 18:05.772 northern part of Africa ? If you roll 18:05.772 --> 18:07.828 the clock back maybe a decade , that 18:07.828 --> 18:07.310 seems to be the best place you could 18:07.310 --> 18:09.421 hide in plain sight , uh , especially 18:09.421 --> 18:11.643 in the northern point of Tunisia , uh , 18:11.643 --> 18:13.699 with the , the , the vastness of the 18:13.699 --> 18:15.790 desert , um , are we seeing anything 18:15.790 --> 18:17.846 happening developing in the northern 18:17.846 --> 18:20.469 part of Africa because it seems as if 18:20.469 --> 18:22.750 we're centrally kind of focused on 18:23.069 --> 18:25.180 where all the rare earth minerals are 18:25.180 --> 18:27.560 being mined . Congressman , that's a 18:27.560 --> 18:29.869 great question . And I've always been , 18:29.989 --> 18:31.989 uh , through , through my tenure of 18:31.989 --> 18:35.150 command in the last 3 years engaging 18:35.150 --> 18:37.489 with all these countries , uh , to the 18:37.489 --> 18:40.630 degree , uh , as we look at this is 18:40.630 --> 18:43.349 NATO's southern flank , and I see those 18:43.349 --> 18:45.405 strategic choke points on there . We 18:45.405 --> 18:47.516 need freedom of navigation or freedom 18:47.516 --> 18:49.627 of action uh for our ships in support 18:49.627 --> 18:51.793 of those war plans , uh , for NATO and 18:51.793 --> 18:54.760 for UCOM . So I've um been working 18:54.760 --> 18:56.760 overtime and engaging with these 18:56.760 --> 18:58.927 countries . Morocco's doing their part 18:58.927 --> 19:01.390 and even Algeria , um , which in some 19:01.390 --> 19:03.560 uh realms that , uh , we disagree on 19:03.560 --> 19:05.560 some things , but Algeria , we were 19:05.560 --> 19:08.079 able to uh to sign a nonbinding 19:08.079 --> 19:10.190 agreement in cooperation , but I will 19:10.190 --> 19:12.246 tell you that , uh , Russia is still 19:12.246 --> 19:14.412 there . They're still trying to effect 19:14.412 --> 19:16.468 uh an agreement on their own so they 19:16.468 --> 19:18.690 can get uh basing access or port access 19:18.690 --> 19:20.857 and as you even . Go down into Libya , 19:20.857 --> 19:23.023 you know , I met with , uh , uh , Phil 19:23.023 --> 19:25.190 Marshall Haftar , uh , almost , uh , 2 19:25.190 --> 19:26.968 times , actually 2 times , uh , 19:26.968 --> 19:29.265 engaging them to , uh , to ensure that 19:29.265 --> 19:31.598 we can work with them because they have , 19:31.598 --> 19:33.376 we have shared , uh , threats , 19:33.376 --> 19:35.487 especially along the southern borders 19:35.487 --> 19:37.654 of terrorism , uh , just engaging with 19:37.654 --> 19:39.432 both sides trying to get , uh , 19:39.432 --> 19:41.487 collective agreement , uh , in Libya 19:41.487 --> 19:43.709 between the GNU and the LNA , uh , that 19:43.709 --> 19:45.821 is essential that we keep . Uh , uh , 19:45.821 --> 19:48.692 US , uh , diplomatic , uh , agreements 19:48.692 --> 19:50.525 and , and cooperation with these 19:50.525 --> 19:52.692 countries , uh , because we see , uh , 19:52.692 --> 19:54.803 what Russia is trying to do establish 19:54.803 --> 19:56.852 some ports across the Mediterranean 19:56.852 --> 19:59.072 warm water ports , uh , so that it'll 19:59.072 --> 20:01.239 affect their operations , try to get a 20:01.239 --> 20:03.461 decisive advantage , uh , but we're not 20:03.461 --> 20:05.628 going to let that happen in phase zero 20:05.628 --> 20:07.572 coherency operations that we do in 20:07.572 --> 20:09.683 AFICO . Thank you , Ms . Thompson . I 20:09.683 --> 20:11.869 have nothing for you today . Keep up 20:11.869 --> 20:13.980 the great work . Are you back , sir . 20:14.739 --> 20:18.060 You got it easy today from him . All 20:18.060 --> 20:19.849 right , we now have , uh , Mr . 20:19.939 --> 20:22.272 Cisneros is recognized . Thank you , Mr . 20:22.272 --> 20:24.383 Chairman , and , uh , General Corella 20:24.383 --> 20:26.550 and , uh , General Langley , thank you 20:26.550 --> 20:28.495 both for your , uh , years of , of 20:28.495 --> 20:30.606 service and dedication to our country 20:30.606 --> 20:32.772 as you both , uh , get ready to retire 20:32.772 --> 20:34.661 here in a in a while . But , um , 20:34.661 --> 20:36.828 General Langley , um , you know , when 20:36.828 --> 20:38.939 I was in the Navy , my ship , the USS 20:38.939 --> 20:41.969 Ogden . Uh , stopped in Eritrea , which 20:41.969 --> 20:43.913 was at that time a new independent 20:43.913 --> 20:46.640 nation , um , you know , we went there 20:46.640 --> 20:48.890 to show the flag , uh , but to show 20:48.890 --> 20:51.112 support for this new country and really 20:51.112 --> 20:54.280 to the region as well . Um , but that's 20:54.280 --> 20:56.613 not the impression I'm getting from the , 20:56.613 --> 20:58.502 the current administration . Uh , 20:58.502 --> 21:00.669 they're pulling away foreign aid ships 21:00.669 --> 21:02.891 aren't visiting the continent like they 21:02.891 --> 21:05.113 used to . Uh , we're leaving a void for 21:05.113 --> 21:07.169 for Russia and for the PRC to fill . 21:07.169 --> 21:09.280 And you've been quoted as saying that 21:09.280 --> 21:11.280 the PRC is replicating what we have 21:11.280 --> 21:13.447 done in Africa targeting targeting the 21:13.447 --> 21:15.502 international military education and 21:15.502 --> 21:17.558 training program that they also said 21:17.558 --> 21:17.180 they're going to increase security and 21:17.180 --> 21:19.599 training in a number of countries . In 21:19.599 --> 21:21.655 April it was reported that Cairo and 21:21.655 --> 21:23.877 the PRC were planning to participate in 21:23.877 --> 21:25.821 a joint exercise between their air 21:25.821 --> 21:28.209 forces . As the administration 21:28.209 --> 21:30.780 continues to pull back and the PRC 21:30.780 --> 21:33.209 continues to build relations , uh , 21:33.780 --> 21:35.836 what in your opinion is the national 21:35.836 --> 21:38.699 security risk and impact uh to Africa 21:38.699 --> 21:40.477 as well as to us here at home ? 21:43.750 --> 21:47.239 Uh . Um , I'd say , uh , the 21:47.239 --> 21:50.030 CCP is trying to replicate what we do . 21:50.640 --> 21:53.170 Uh , what we've done in the past . Uh , 21:53.189 --> 21:55.030 and have a strategic advantage , 21:55.510 --> 21:57.510 especially , uh , engaging with our 21:57.510 --> 21:59.910 African partners , uh , because they 21:59.910 --> 22:02.069 want to be able to , uh , establish a 22:02.069 --> 22:04.869 enabler to close the decisive gap that 22:04.869 --> 22:07.189 we've had over them for years . Uh , 22:07.270 --> 22:09.326 I'll just go in the maritime sense , 22:09.326 --> 22:11.326 especially with , uh , their net of 22:11.326 --> 22:13.270 their netta , which is the , their 22:13.270 --> 22:15.381 naval expeditionary task force . They 22:15.381 --> 22:17.548 go around the . The periphery of uh of 22:17.548 --> 22:19.659 the African continent engaging with a 22:19.659 --> 22:21.770 number of countries , uh , we need to 22:21.770 --> 22:23.937 be able to get that uh you you brought 22:23.937 --> 22:26.270 up a , you know , your naval background , 22:26.270 --> 22:28.492 you know , when we had uh the Argmuse , 22:28.492 --> 22:30.437 uh , we're not heel to toe anymore 22:30.437 --> 22:32.839 we're not 3.0 , uh , we do need , uh , 22:32.849 --> 22:34.960 the , the amphibious readiness , uh , 22:34.960 --> 22:37.238 group and , uh , the , the , the , the , 22:37.238 --> 22:39.405 the , the marine . Expeditionary units 22:39.405 --> 22:41.670 out there on ships , uh , that is a 22:41.670 --> 22:44.819 force multiplier uh for crisis response , 22:44.989 --> 22:47.069 uh , or any other , uh , show of 22:47.069 --> 22:49.291 deterrence . uh , I say , uh , you know 22:49.291 --> 22:51.589 that's not , uh , that doesn't go 22:51.589 --> 22:53.700 across political lines that that goes 22:53.700 --> 22:55.867 in operational lines , uh , you know , 22:55.867 --> 22:58.200 Navy as I met with , uh , uh , the , uh , 22:58.200 --> 23:00.650 the , the , the vice admiral , uh . Uh , 23:00.849 --> 23:03.170 uh , in , in their operation sense but 23:03.170 --> 23:05.430 also , uh , met , met with Admiral 23:05.430 --> 23:07.729 Kilby and , and also Stuart Munch and 23:07.729 --> 23:10.119 uh they are bringing up the capability 23:10.119 --> 23:12.140 to try to provide Africa with that 23:12.140 --> 23:14.307 capability so that we can compete with 23:14.307 --> 23:16.584 China , especially in a maritime sense , 23:16.584 --> 23:18.584 uh , so I would say that , uh , one 23:18.584 --> 23:20.751 step in the right direction is getting 23:20.751 --> 23:22.918 those Arms back out there and then the 23:22.918 --> 23:25.029 ARCO theater , right , Gator Navy all 23:25.029 --> 23:27.739 the way . Uh , Ms . Thompson , uh , you 23:27.739 --> 23:29.850 said in your opening remarks that the 23:29.850 --> 23:32.650 department is working , um , with , uh , 23:32.660 --> 23:34.930 uh , well , with its , um , African 23:34.930 --> 23:38.089 with African nations to grow , um , 23:38.819 --> 23:41.140 working with them to , to increase 23:41.140 --> 23:43.140 operational independence for these 23:43.140 --> 23:45.260 African nations , but I think really 23:45.260 --> 23:47.427 what we're seeing right is they're not 23:47.427 --> 23:49.649 doing that , they're moving towards the 23:49.649 --> 23:51.316 PRC . Uh , as you know , as I 23:51.316 --> 23:53.719 referenced here , uh , uh , Egypt and , 23:53.800 --> 23:56.199 and , um , the PRC kind of talking 23:56.199 --> 23:59.170 about doing joint operations . Um , how 23:59.170 --> 24:01.930 does the department not see this as a 24:01.930 --> 24:04.449 red flag ? Uh , why aren't we doing 24:04.449 --> 24:06.338 something about this ? Why are we 24:06.338 --> 24:08.338 pulling away and we're just pushing 24:08.338 --> 24:10.393 them in the , the , the direction of 24:10.393 --> 24:12.393 our , you know , of , of our pacing 24:12.393 --> 24:14.505 threat here . Sir , thank you for the 24:14.505 --> 24:16.616 question . I really appreciate it and 24:16.616 --> 24:18.616 um , I would point you first to our 24:18.616 --> 24:20.560 interim national defense strategic 24:20.560 --> 24:22.671 guidance . Our top two priorities are 24:22.671 --> 24:24.727 defense of the homeland , countering 24:24.727 --> 24:23.829 terrorist threats that have the 24:23.829 --> 24:25.829 capability and intent to strike the 24:25.829 --> 24:27.940 homeland , and then deterrence of the 24:27.940 --> 24:30.051 the PRC , particularly in the Western 24:30.051 --> 24:32.273 Pacific , but obviously as you outlined 24:32.273 --> 24:31.910 absolutely correctly , um , that bleeds 24:31.910 --> 24:34.132 over to the African continent as well . 24:34.132 --> 24:36.188 And so I would say from our Title 10 24:36.188 --> 24:38.188 security assistance approach to the 24:38.188 --> 24:40.410 continent , um , but then also as we're 24:40.410 --> 24:42.466 in the . Development process for our 24:42.466 --> 24:44.577 national defense strategy , uh , this 24:44.577 --> 24:44.280 is something that is top of mind , and 24:44.280 --> 24:46.280 this is certainly not an area where 24:46.280 --> 24:48.502 we're pulling back . We want to be very 24:48.502 --> 24:50.558 targeted and strategic , um , in our 24:50.558 --> 24:49.920 approach to make sure that we are 24:49.920 --> 24:52.142 deterring the PRCs , particularly their 24:52.142 --> 24:54.309 ability to have a military advantage , 24:54.309 --> 24:56.476 um , on the continent . So I , I would 24:56.476 --> 24:58.531 share your , your assessment on that 24:58.531 --> 25:00.753 front . Well , please take that back to 25:00.753 --> 25:02.809 the heads over there , right , as we 25:02.809 --> 25:04.920 continue to pull away , uh , they are 25:04.920 --> 25:04.920 continuing to build relationships with 25:04.920 --> 25:07.670 China and the PRC . And you know , they 25:07.670 --> 25:09.892 are PRC is more than happy to fill that 25:09.892 --> 25:12.180 void as we pull away uh and this should 25:12.180 --> 25:14.180 be a red flag that they are working 25:14.180 --> 25:16.402 with these things and that is something 25:16.402 --> 25:18.402 that needs to be brought up and and 25:18.402 --> 25:20.513 considered and with that I yield back 25:20.513 --> 25:22.847 my time . Gentlemen , yous back . Chair , 25:22.847 --> 25:24.791 and I recognize the gentleman from 25:24.791 --> 25:24.719 Georgia , Doctor McCormick . Thank you , 25:24.729 --> 25:27.359 Mr . Chair , General Colla , General 25:27.359 --> 25:30.050 Langley . It's been a pleasure working 25:30.050 --> 25:32.106 with you . I wish you fair winds and 25:32.106 --> 25:34.106 following seas and your , uh , next 25:34.106 --> 25:36.217 endeavors . I'm sure you'll be highly 25:36.217 --> 25:38.272 successful . We'll miss you . Uh , I 25:38.272 --> 25:40.328 consider you friends and if any time 25:40.328 --> 25:42.494 you ever want to share a beverage or a 25:42.494 --> 25:44.494 box of crayons , just let me know . 25:44.494 --> 25:46.717 I'll always be available . Uh , General 25:46.717 --> 25:48.772 Langley , I'll start with you . Uh , 25:48.772 --> 25:51.609 the Djibouti air base cluster is within 25:51.609 --> 25:53.831 striking distance of some of the Houthi 25:53.831 --> 25:55.942 weapons , and , and I was wondering , 25:55.942 --> 25:57.887 especially with the development of 25:57.887 --> 26:00.109 drones that have been developed in Iran 26:00.109 --> 26:02.331 and put together , uh , in Yemen , uh , 26:02.331 --> 26:04.442 what are we doing for countermeasures 26:04.442 --> 26:03.890 and do you think we could do better ? 26:03.930 --> 26:06.520 How can we assist you in equipping our , 26:06.640 --> 26:08.599 our bases with countermeasures for 26:08.599 --> 26:10.810 those advanced drones and what they're 26:10.810 --> 26:14.619 trying to develop ? Congressman , it's 26:14.619 --> 26:16.699 an evolving threat , uh , especially 26:16.699 --> 26:19.060 with uh the these on other side of the 26:19.060 --> 26:23.010 Red Sea , um . Uh , and I will get into 26:23.010 --> 26:25.288 the specifics of what we actually need , 26:25.500 --> 26:28.930 um , uh , to , to improve upon , uh , 26:28.939 --> 26:31.770 enhance upon , uh , we're protected now , 26:31.979 --> 26:34.312 uh , but I will get into specifics , uh , 26:34.312 --> 26:36.819 in closed session of , uh , things that 26:36.819 --> 26:38.930 I , I think that that we can continue 26:38.930 --> 26:41.097 to enhance and evolve , uh , in that , 26:41.097 --> 26:42.986 uh , because it's not just , uh , 26:42.986 --> 26:45.263 Djibouti is all the way , uh , down to , 26:45.263 --> 26:47.675 uh , Manda . Uh , in , in , uh , in , 26:47.765 --> 26:50.994 uh , in Kenya , so , um , I , I , I 26:50.994 --> 26:53.944 will say that , uh , this is involving , 26:54.155 --> 26:56.714 uh , the Houthis are gaining in in 26:56.714 --> 26:58.658 capability , uh , and then there's 26:58.658 --> 27:00.834 other , uh , other illicit actors in 27:00.834 --> 27:03.056 the region , uh , that is that that can 27:03.056 --> 27:05.167 be a threat , uh , within East Africa 27:05.167 --> 27:07.334 writ large . Would you say that , uh , 27:07.334 --> 27:09.556 it's safe to assume that we have a ways 27:09.556 --> 27:11.395 to go to , to be secure in our 27:11.395 --> 27:14.030 endeavors . Uh , we will always , uh , 27:14.040 --> 27:16.096 do position improvement , you know , 27:16.096 --> 27:18.262 our , our fighting holes , uh , always 27:18.262 --> 27:20.318 need to be improved , uh , for force 27:20.318 --> 27:22.207 protection . That's my number one 27:22.207 --> 27:22.170 mission is , uh , protecting the troops 27:22.170 --> 27:24.059 on the ground . And in regards to 27:24.059 --> 27:26.114 CENTCOM , we , we've seen everything 27:26.114 --> 27:29.560 from Tower 22 to the , the ship lanes , 27:29.810 --> 27:31.810 uh , really kind of being a proving 27:31.810 --> 27:33.866 ground for drone attacks and missile 27:33.866 --> 27:35.810 attacks , and I'm sure we're gonna 27:35.810 --> 27:37.588 eventually encounter supersonic 27:37.588 --> 27:39.921 missiles and other things that are very , 27:39.921 --> 27:41.866 very alarming . Uh , what have you 27:41.866 --> 27:43.754 learned from , from those sort of 27:43.754 --> 27:45.588 contacts as we as we advance our 27:45.588 --> 27:47.532 technologies and we have these new 27:47.532 --> 27:49.643 technologies to deal with ? You , you 27:49.643 --> 27:49.040 have , uh , congressman , you have to 27:49.040 --> 27:51.040 have a layered defense is the first 27:51.040 --> 27:53.040 thing , and you have to continue to 27:53.040 --> 27:54.984 improve upon your capabilities and 27:54.984 --> 27:57.280 evolve faster and move faster than the 27:57.280 --> 27:59.224 enemy can on theirs . Look at what 27:59.224 --> 28:01.224 happened in , uh , in Russia . Uh , 28:01.224 --> 28:03.224 with the Ukraine , when you watched 28:03.224 --> 28:05.169 also them go to fiber optic drones 28:05.169 --> 28:07.391 because the EW and the jamming that was 28:07.391 --> 28:09.391 up there , so they're moving very , 28:09.391 --> 28:11.239 very quickly in terms of , uh , 28:11.250 --> 28:13.361 advancements we have to move faster . 28:13.410 --> 28:15.577 Yeah , I , I've looked , I just talked 28:15.577 --> 28:17.799 to an AI community about that very same 28:17.799 --> 28:19.910 thing closing the kill chain , making 28:19.910 --> 28:22.132 sure that our , our next technologies , 28:22.132 --> 28:22.089 I mean , fly wild wire is awesome , but 28:22.089 --> 28:24.145 it's kind of like a look back at the 28:24.145 --> 28:26.256 tow technology . I wanna look forward 28:26.256 --> 28:28.200 and look at new train models , how 28:28.200 --> 28:30.478 we're gonna do that . Uh , what do you , 28:30.478 --> 28:32.645 what's your feeling in this associated 28:32.645 --> 28:34.867 question that I just came up on just as 28:34.867 --> 28:36.867 we're talking , uh , if we're gonna 28:36.867 --> 28:39.033 have different navigation systems that 28:39.033 --> 28:38.030 aren't gonna be controlled by 28:38.030 --> 28:40.390 semi-autonomous controllers . 28:40.869 --> 28:42.699 Autonomous weapon systems that 28:42.699 --> 28:44.900 literally identify targets without any 28:44.900 --> 28:46.956 input once they're launched and it's 28:46.956 --> 28:49.233 they exist right now . The question is , 28:49.233 --> 28:51.400 would that be a good , I , I , I get a 28:51.400 --> 28:53.622 little bit squeamish when we talk about 28:53.622 --> 28:55.622 autonomous weapon systems that that 28:55.622 --> 28:57.844 direct themselves and we and they don't 28:57.844 --> 28:57.579 have that final I think those exist 28:57.579 --> 28:59.635 right they don't , I know they exist 28:59.635 --> 29:01.857 right now . It's when you get into that 29:01.857 --> 29:04.023 final . Mile that final kilometer that 29:04.023 --> 29:05.959 then locks on a target that's an 29:05.959 --> 29:08.015 autonomous target recognition system 29:08.199 --> 29:10.421 that has been taken it in you can't jam 29:10.421 --> 29:12.421 it , etc . Yeah , good point , good 29:12.421 --> 29:14.477 point . Uh , one of the other things 29:14.477 --> 29:16.588 that that was really interesting is , 29:16.588 --> 29:18.699 is there's US aid and other things we 29:18.699 --> 29:20.810 do in a foreign , uh , investments we 29:20.810 --> 29:22.866 do that now come into question . Now 29:22.866 --> 29:25.032 some has been wasteful , but obviously 29:25.032 --> 29:24.760 I'm not against foreign aid because it 29:24.760 --> 29:27.069 gives us real influence . And and 29:27.069 --> 29:29.125 really create stability in different 29:29.125 --> 29:31.180 regions . Uh , where do you think we 29:31.180 --> 29:33.236 could redirect those funds that have 29:33.236 --> 29:35.069 maybe been not spent on the most 29:35.069 --> 29:37.291 efficient systems this for both you and 29:37.291 --> 29:39.402 I know we only have 45 seconds left , 29:39.402 --> 29:39.380 but where can we best spend the money 29:39.380 --> 29:41.660 we do to influence and create stability 29:41.660 --> 29:43.660 in those regions that we're talking 29:43.660 --> 29:45.882 about right now ? Well , I think from a 29:45.882 --> 29:47.938 USAID State Department is now taking 29:47.938 --> 29:50.104 taking on that responsibility . For us 29:50.104 --> 29:51.938 there are certain countries that 29:51.938 --> 29:53.827 absolutely don't have the natural 29:53.827 --> 29:53.599 resources and those are things that we 29:53.599 --> 29:55.766 need to look at and I can get specific 29:55.766 --> 29:57.877 with you and if if you have a written 29:57.877 --> 30:00.099 question I'll turn it over to my . Uh , 30:00.099 --> 30:02.266 phase four operations stability . I've 30:02.266 --> 30:04.488 seen it work in , uh , in Somalia , you 30:04.488 --> 30:06.377 know , as they we're going , uh , 30:06.377 --> 30:08.599 through , uh , lower and middle Shaelli 30:08.599 --> 30:10.932 from , uh , from 2022 , uh , heretofore , 30:11.060 --> 30:13.270 uh , but , uh , without that and 30:13.270 --> 30:15.780 recreation or recreating that and , uh , 30:15.790 --> 30:17.568 or , uh , gaining it from other 30:17.568 --> 30:19.568 countries , uh , that there there's 30:19.568 --> 30:21.790 gonna be a lapse in , uh , completing , 30:21.790 --> 30:23.957 uh , a credible force to do the hold . 30:23.957 --> 30:25.901 My best to you both gentlemen love 30:25.901 --> 30:28.068 working with you simplify . Jim's time 30:28.068 --> 30:30.068 expired . uh , chair , I recognized 30:30.068 --> 30:32.012 gentle lady from California , Ms . 30:32.012 --> 30:34.068 Jacobs . Thank you , Mr . Chairman , 30:34.068 --> 30:36.179 and I will echo all of my colleagues' 30:36.179 --> 30:38.179 thanks to both of you for your many 30:38.179 --> 30:40.179 decades of service . I've very much 30:40.179 --> 30:39.810 enjoyed working with all of you and 30:39.810 --> 30:41.699 General Crulla , as predicted , I 30:41.699 --> 30:45.260 outlasted you . Um , uh , General 30:45.260 --> 30:47.329 Langley , I first want to , uh , 30:47.380 --> 30:50.050 discuss our strategy in Somalia , um . 30:50.900 --> 30:52.844 Under your leadership , the United 30:52.844 --> 30:54.956 States has rapidly increased the pace 30:54.956 --> 30:57.067 of airstrikes against both al-Shabaab 30:57.067 --> 30:59.289 and ISIS Somalia . In the past 5 months 30:59.289 --> 31:01.511 alone , the US has conducted 37 strikes 31:01.511 --> 31:03.567 compared to just 4 during the entire 31:03.567 --> 31:05.844 first year of the Biden administration . 31:05.844 --> 31:07.733 That's actually nearly as many as 31:07.733 --> 31:09.956 President Trump authorized in his first 31:09.956 --> 31:12.579 year , which totaled 39 . Um , so could 31:12.579 --> 31:14.801 you first tell me what is the objective 31:14.801 --> 31:16.023 of these airstrikes ? 31:19.800 --> 31:23.439 Congresswoman , uh , this is one of the 31:23.439 --> 31:25.550 number one objectives of Secretary He 31:25.550 --> 31:27.439 came in , uh , when he became the 31:27.439 --> 31:29.910 Secretary of Defense . He said , uh , 31:30.119 --> 31:32.510 AFRO needs to do counterterrorism 31:32.510 --> 31:34.869 operations to protect the homeland . Up 31:34.869 --> 31:36.980 there in the Golas Mountains you have 31:36.980 --> 31:39.319 ISIS Somalia . They have the propensity 31:39.319 --> 31:42.010 to affect the homeland whether it be uh 31:42.010 --> 31:44.177 global financing . Uh , we had to stop 31:44.177 --> 31:47.209 that , uh , you know , we did have an 31:47.209 --> 31:49.880 operation back in 2023 , but , uh , 31:49.890 --> 31:52.089 ISIS , uh , Somalia has grown . A 31:52.089 --> 31:54.367 matter of fact , the Emir is there now . 31:54.439 --> 31:56.449 Uh , they've only increased their 31:56.449 --> 31:58.671 capability and capacity . That's why we 31:58.671 --> 32:00.616 had to turn up the heat on putting 32:00.616 --> 32:02.699 pressure through lethal means to be 32:02.699 --> 32:05.160 able to retry . I , I , I understand , 32:05.250 --> 32:07.194 um , the threat . I guess what I'm 32:07.194 --> 32:09.139 concerned about is that we've been 32:09.139 --> 32:11.410 using this same logic for decades . It 32:11.410 --> 32:13.577 doesn't seem like it's attached to any 32:13.577 --> 32:15.632 ability for us to eventually leave , 32:15.632 --> 32:17.770 and we saw that for instance in 2019 32:17.770 --> 32:20.400 when there was uh expanded airstrikes 32:20.400 --> 32:22.456 that it didn't actually translate to 32:22.456 --> 32:24.567 fewer al-Shabaab attacks in Somalia . 32:24.567 --> 32:26.456 So are these airstrikes part of a 32:26.456 --> 32:28.622 coherent articulated strategy aimed at 32:28.622 --> 32:30.456 enabling long-term stability and 32:30.456 --> 32:32.678 ultimately drawing down the US military 32:32.678 --> 32:35.479 footprint ? Yes , that's , that's our 32:35.479 --> 32:37.590 operational intent right now , and to 32:37.590 --> 32:40.400 be able to cease or deter their ability 32:40.400 --> 32:42.890 for X ops to protect the homeland . 32:44.040 --> 32:46.207 OK , that's different than there being 32:46.207 --> 32:48.540 an actual strategy . Um , Ms . Thompson , 32:48.540 --> 32:50.429 you said Somalia is an incredible 32:50.429 --> 32:52.651 success . I think I would disagree with 32:52.651 --> 32:54.839 your , um , assessment of that . Is 32:54.839 --> 32:57.140 there a whole of government coherent 32:57.140 --> 32:59.307 articulated strategy aimed at enabling 32:59.307 --> 33:01.251 long-term stability and ultimately 33:01.251 --> 33:03.418 drawing down the US military footprint 33:03.418 --> 33:05.751 in Somalia ? Thank you for the question , 33:05.751 --> 33:07.807 Congresswoman . I would highlight my 33:07.807 --> 33:09.973 commentary was meant to associate with 33:09.973 --> 33:11.973 the INDSG guidance . Our number one 33:11.973 --> 33:14.140 objective is obviously to deter , um , 33:14.140 --> 33:16.029 and deny and degrade credible and 33:16.029 --> 33:18.362 credible ex ops threats to the homeland , 33:18.362 --> 33:20.584 um , and I , as I've highlighted and as 33:20.584 --> 33:22.362 you highlighted in your opening 33:22.362 --> 33:24.529 comments , um , the significant uptick 33:24.529 --> 33:26.640 in strikes is demonstrative of , uh , 33:26.640 --> 33:28.862 basically attaching those activities to 33:28.862 --> 33:30.973 our number one INDSG objective . So I 33:30.973 --> 33:33.196 would , I would articulate that that is 33:33.196 --> 33:35.418 where the connection to the strategy is 33:35.418 --> 33:37.640 in terms of force posture in Somalia on 33:37.640 --> 33:39.751 a long-term basis . This is something 33:39.751 --> 33:39.204 that obviously we would contemplate as 33:39.204 --> 33:41.037 part of the broader global force 33:41.037 --> 33:43.037 posture review and no decisions for 33:43.037 --> 33:45.037 ARCO or for anywhere else have been 33:45.037 --> 33:46.926 made at this time , um , but it's 33:46.926 --> 33:49.037 certainly something that would factor 33:49.037 --> 33:48.525 into the none of this sounds like an 33:48.525 --> 33:50.692 actual strategy to create stability in 33:50.692 --> 33:52.692 Somalia , so I will look forward to 33:52.692 --> 33:55.025 following up with you both on that . Um , 33:55.025 --> 33:57.136 General Corilla , I'd like to turn to 33:57.136 --> 33:59.247 you now on Yemen , um . Civil society 33:59.247 --> 34:01.358 and media organizations have reported 34:01.358 --> 34:03.525 numerous civilian casualties caused by 34:03.525 --> 34:05.747 recent US operations in Yemen , many as 34:05.747 --> 34:07.914 a result of the use of heavy explosive 34:07.914 --> 34:09.747 weapons in populated areas . For 34:09.747 --> 34:11.803 example , the US strikes on Ras Issa 34:11.803 --> 34:14.025 port in Hodeidah . Um , on April 17th , 34:14.025 --> 34:16.358 reportedly killed at least 84 civilians . 34:16.358 --> 34:18.469 So one , did CENCOM foresee the level 34:18.469 --> 34:20.539 of civilian harm reported and what 34:20.539 --> 34:22.650 steps did CENCOM take to mitigate the 34:22.650 --> 34:24.539 risks of civilian harm during the 34:24.539 --> 34:26.761 conduct of recent strikes in Yemen ? So 34:26.761 --> 34:28.817 any civilian death is a tragedy is a 34:28.817 --> 34:30.872 tragedy . What we have is a civilian 34:30.872 --> 34:32.706 harm mitigation team , um , that 34:32.706 --> 34:34.872 investigates every single one of these 34:34.872 --> 34:36.817 to determine if they're credible . 34:36.817 --> 34:39.095 There are still several that are under . 34:39.095 --> 34:41.261 Investigation you mentioned Ross Isa . 34:41.261 --> 34:43.372 There were several things that we did 34:43.372 --> 34:45.595 to mitigate that prior to include heavy 34:45.595 --> 34:47.872 ISR soaking of that prior to that . Um , 34:47.872 --> 34:49.872 we did messaging to the individuals 34:49.872 --> 34:51.983 there we did messaging to the ships . 34:51.983 --> 34:51.718 We insured the weaponeering , the 34:51.718 --> 34:53.829 mitigation of those systems . Now the 34:53.829 --> 34:55.996 problem is you have a fuel port , um , 34:55.996 --> 34:58.107 that is being hit . We did not target 34:58.107 --> 35:00.274 the , uh , the trucks that were in the 35:00.274 --> 35:00.209 in the port at that same time . But 35:00.209 --> 35:02.320 again that that's under investigation 35:02.320 --> 35:04.320 to determine the actual numbers and 35:04.320 --> 35:06.376 again I would argue that this is the 35:06.376 --> 35:08.487 Houthi casualty numbers as well . And 35:08.487 --> 35:10.709 can you commit today on behalf of SETCO 35:10.709 --> 35:10.610 to publish your findings on civilian 35:10.610 --> 35:12.666 casualties in Yemen ? all of that up 35:12.666 --> 35:14.832 and to the OSD and they end up pushing 35:14.832 --> 35:16.888 those out . OK , so you will publish 35:16.888 --> 35:18.999 absolutely excellent . Um , thank you 35:18.999 --> 35:21.332 so much , and Mr . Chairman , I go back . 35:21.540 --> 35:23.262 Gentleman yields back here now 35:23.262 --> 35:25.596 recognizes this gentleman from Colorado , 35:25.596 --> 35:27.873 Mr . Crank . Thank you , Mr . Chairman . 35:27.873 --> 35:29.818 Uh , Ms . Thompson , thank you for 35:29.818 --> 35:31.762 being here . Generals Carrilla and 35:31.762 --> 35:33.929 Langley , thank you for being here and 35:33.929 --> 35:36.040 for your service . Uh , I wanna start 35:36.040 --> 35:38.096 by asking you the same question I've 35:38.096 --> 35:40.151 asked every combatant commander that 35:40.151 --> 35:42.373 has come before Has this year . In your 35:42.373 --> 35:44.429 opinion , has the space-based threat 35:44.429 --> 35:46.540 from China and Russia in your theater 35:46.899 --> 35:49.409 improved or worsened in the last 5 35:49.409 --> 35:52.409 years ? From a CENTCOM perspective , 35:52.570 --> 35:54.681 Russia has actually gone down because 35:54.681 --> 35:56.848 they're no longer really in the region 35:56.848 --> 35:58.903 where they were basing some of their 35:58.903 --> 36:00.959 space-based threats . Um , China has 36:00.959 --> 36:03.070 probably increased , um , but I would 36:03.070 --> 36:04.848 tell you Iran has significantly 36:04.848 --> 36:06.903 increased , so overall increased you 36:06.903 --> 36:09.600 would say , yeah , General Langley . On 36:09.600 --> 36:11.909 a continents increased , uh , 36:12.120 --> 36:14.231 especially down in Namibia dual use , 36:14.231 --> 36:16.679 uh , state sponsored type , uh , space 36:16.679 --> 36:19.639 enabling capabilities by the CCP . Yeah , 36:19.760 --> 36:22.120 and obviously we're in an open setting 36:22.120 --> 36:24.176 here , but can you provide a maybe a 36:24.176 --> 36:26.399 brief description of how this threat 36:26.399 --> 36:28.288 affects your operations , General 36:28.288 --> 36:30.455 Carrilla ? I would be happy to do that 36:30.455 --> 36:32.621 in a closed session . OK , that sounds 36:32.621 --> 36:34.732 good , general same . OK . Yes , in a 36:34.732 --> 36:36.732 close session . OK , thank you . On 36:36.732 --> 36:38.955 another topic , I'm concerned about the 36:38.955 --> 36:41.010 nuclear threat from Iran and reports 36:41.010 --> 36:43.177 that they rejected the latest proposal 36:43.177 --> 36:45.459 for a new nuclear deal from the US and 36:45.459 --> 36:48.340 it seems like Iran is hell bent on uh 36:48.340 --> 36:50.649 having nuclear weapons which would be a 36:50.649 --> 36:53.260 direct threat to the existence of 36:53.260 --> 36:55.699 Israel . uh General Corilla , in your 36:55.699 --> 36:57.699 written testimony you say quote , a 36:57.699 --> 36:59.699 nuclear armed Iran would change the 36:59.699 --> 37:01.929 Middle East overnight and forever . 37:02.389 --> 37:04.750 Potentially setting off a regional arms 37:04.750 --> 37:07.790 race with catastrophic consequences 37:07.790 --> 37:10.012 unquote . Can you expand on this ? What 37:10.012 --> 37:13.070 would a Middle East with a nuclear Iran 37:13.070 --> 37:15.439 look like ? I think you would see other 37:15.439 --> 37:17.106 countries in the region doing 37:17.106 --> 37:18.995 everything they could to obtain a 37:18.995 --> 37:21.161 nuclear weapon , either development or 37:21.161 --> 37:23.272 through purchase , um , to be able to 37:23.272 --> 37:25.050 gain one , to be able to retain 37:25.050 --> 37:27.520 deterrence back with Iran . And how can 37:27.520 --> 37:30.620 CEO deter Iran uh from proceeding with 37:30.620 --> 37:32.842 their nuclear development program ? How 37:32.842 --> 37:34.842 can they strengthen the president's 37:34.842 --> 37:36.731 hand at the negotiating table ? I 37:36.731 --> 37:38.620 provide a range of options to the 37:38.620 --> 37:40.731 president , but I'm in all favor of , 37:40.731 --> 37:40.280 uh , having a negotiated settlement 37:40.280 --> 37:42.169 that prevents Iran from getting a 37:42.169 --> 37:43.836 nuclear weapon because of the 37:43.836 --> 37:45.919 consequences of conflict , OK ? And 37:45.919 --> 37:48.141 then General Corella , what lessons can 37:48.141 --> 37:50.600 the US learn from Iron Dome ? Uh , that 37:50.600 --> 37:52.767 could be applied to the development of 37:52.767 --> 37:54.767 Golden Dome . Do you believe , uh , 37:54.767 --> 37:56.989 deterrence by denial to be an effective 37:56.989 --> 37:59.439 strategy ? It can be , um , but I would 37:59.439 --> 38:01.495 tell you some of the biggest lessons 38:01.495 --> 38:03.272 learned is how Israel's defense 38:03.272 --> 38:05.495 industrial base works . You cannot even 38:05.495 --> 38:07.717 sell a system to the Israeli military , 38:07.717 --> 38:09.828 the IDF that is not open architecture 38:09.828 --> 38:11.828 that will not work with the rest of 38:11.828 --> 38:13.828 their systems , so you don't end up 38:13.828 --> 38:15.995 with a proprietary system that's stand 38:15.995 --> 38:17.828 alone . We need systems that can 38:17.828 --> 38:19.995 integrate and all talk to each other . 38:19.995 --> 38:22.217 And so Golden Dome should . Should take 38:22.217 --> 38:23.995 note of that . That would be my 38:23.995 --> 38:23.550 recommendation . OK , thank you , 38:23.560 --> 38:26.120 General . uh , Ms . Thompson , how does 38:26.120 --> 38:28.399 our partnership with Jordan advance 38:28.399 --> 38:30.677 peace and stability in the Middle East ? 38:32.350 --> 38:34.406 Thank you for the question , sir . I 38:34.406 --> 38:36.294 think Jordan in particular in our 38:36.294 --> 38:38.350 partnership with the Jordanian Armed 38:38.350 --> 38:40.517 Forces , um , not only goes to promote 38:40.517 --> 38:40.429 greater burden sharing throughout the 38:40.429 --> 38:43.510 region to include , uh , countering 38:43.510 --> 38:45.177 shared threats that we have , 38:45.177 --> 38:47.288 particularly on the terrorism front , 38:47.288 --> 38:49.288 but then also weapons and narcotics 38:49.288 --> 38:51.454 smuggling and interdiction . They're a 38:51.454 --> 38:50.975 really great partner on that . Um , and 38:50.975 --> 38:53.086 then UAS and ballistic missile , uh , 38:53.086 --> 38:55.142 interdiction as well , and , and I'm 38:55.142 --> 38:57.197 sure General Krilla can provide some 38:57.197 --> 38:57.165 more operational specifics , but those 38:57.165 --> 38:59.387 are the , those are the main pillars of 38:59.387 --> 39:01.609 the , the security relationship that we 39:01.609 --> 39:03.665 have with the Jordanians . General , 39:03.665 --> 39:05.887 they're one of our strongest partners . 39:05.887 --> 39:08.109 Um , they're the country I have visited 39:08.109 --> 39:10.332 the most when I go to the Middle East , 39:10.332 --> 39:12.109 OK ? Is there any more that the 39:12.109 --> 39:12.020 department could do to support 39:12.020 --> 39:14.076 Jordanian armed forces ? I , I think 39:14.076 --> 39:16.020 there are things that we can do to 39:16.020 --> 39:18.242 strongpoint Jordan in the counter UAS . 39:18.540 --> 39:21.100 Counter UAS in Jordan defends both 39:21.100 --> 39:24.179 Jordan , US forces , and Israel . OK . 39:24.989 --> 39:27.156 Thank you , Ms . Thompson , uh , after 39:27.156 --> 39:29.510 years of neglect by President Biden , 39:29.719 --> 39:32.120 President Trump is right to prioritize 39:32.120 --> 39:34.679 our Gulf partners . How did his recent 39:34.679 --> 39:37.820 visit to the region advance US national 39:37.820 --> 39:40.570 security interests ? Thank you for the 39:40.570 --> 39:42.459 question , sir , and I would just 39:42.459 --> 39:44.681 highlight particularly the deepening of 39:44.681 --> 39:46.792 defense partnerships that we have not 39:46.792 --> 39:46.370 only , I mean , as General Krilla has 39:46.370 --> 39:48.426 highlighted , obviously we have um a 39:48.426 --> 39:50.537 long way to go on working through the 39:50.537 --> 39:52.370 the kinks in our FMS process and 39:52.370 --> 39:54.592 defense industrial base , but deepening 39:54.592 --> 39:56.814 those partnerships to enable greater uh 39:56.814 --> 39:58.926 allied burden sharing , but then also 39:58.926 --> 40:01.148 interoperability and empowerment of our 40:01.148 --> 40:03.203 Gulf partners to take on more of the 40:03.203 --> 40:05.203 responsibility in the region , um , 40:05.203 --> 40:05.090 particularly given normalized relations 40:05.090 --> 40:07.146 with Israel , um , for a fair few of 40:07.146 --> 40:09.350 them . Uh , it is a , is a , is a 40:09.350 --> 40:11.572 massive step in the right direction for 40:11.572 --> 40:13.517 the posture we want to have in the 40:13.517 --> 40:15.628 region . And then I would also , um , 40:15.628 --> 40:17.628 just highlight the , the commercial 40:17.628 --> 40:19.850 success as well . that's coupled with , 40:19.850 --> 40:19.469 um , the defense success and I think 40:19.469 --> 40:21.358 both , um , per President Trump's 40:21.358 --> 40:23.413 comments and Riyadh really echo that 40:23.413 --> 40:25.636 sentiment . Thank you , Mr . Chairman , 40:25.636 --> 40:27.949 thank you . G time expired . Uh , I do 40:27.949 --> 40:30.060 want to make the announcement that uh 40:30.060 --> 40:32.810 we will be , um . Concluding the open 40:32.810 --> 40:36.239 session at 12:30 , uh , and going into 40:36.239 --> 40:38.850 a classified session a few minutes 40:38.850 --> 40:40.961 thereafter because votes are gonna be 40:40.961 --> 40:43.209 called on the House floor at 1:30 . So 40:43.209 --> 40:45.431 with that , the chair , I recognize the 40:45.431 --> 40:47.542 gentleman from New York , Mr . Ryan , 40:47.542 --> 40:49.653 for 5 minutes . Uh , thank you , Mr . 40:49.653 --> 40:51.709 Chairman . I'm sorry to my colleague 40:51.709 --> 40:51.290 from Pennsylvania . I think I got here 40:51.290 --> 40:54.919 after you . Um , thank , thank you , uh , 40:54.929 --> 40:57.010 all for being here , um , especially 40:57.010 --> 40:58.899 given that it's both of your last 40:58.899 --> 41:00.732 hearings , generals , Coilla and 41:00.732 --> 41:02.566 Langley , just wanna . That's an 41:02.566 --> 41:04.850 appropriate fist bump . Um , just wanna 41:04.850 --> 41:07.017 commend and thank you both , as I know 41:07.017 --> 41:09.128 many of my colleagues have but cannot 41:09.128 --> 41:11.350 be said enough . uh , appreciate it and 41:11.350 --> 41:13.461 General Colla in particular , I wanna 41:13.461 --> 41:15.739 commend you . I , I don't think you've , 41:15.739 --> 41:17.794 I know you're a , a , a humble quiet 41:17.794 --> 41:17.770 professional , but I think in 41:17.770 --> 41:21.090 particular what you did in defense of 41:21.090 --> 41:23.257 Israel , in defense of the region , in 41:23.257 --> 41:25.423 defense of the US . Most importantly , 41:25.423 --> 41:28.510 in your leadership on two unprecedented 41:28.510 --> 41:30.566 direct attacks , as you said in your 41:30.566 --> 41:32.454 opening testimony that have never 41:32.454 --> 41:34.621 occurred in the history of either Iran 41:34.621 --> 41:36.350 or Israel , your leadership in 41:36.350 --> 41:38.406 preparing and executing that defense 41:38.406 --> 41:40.510 was exceptional and , and I think we 41:40.510 --> 41:42.621 all have a lot to learn on a bunch of 41:42.621 --> 41:44.843 levels from that , but I just wanted to 41:44.843 --> 41:46.954 say that publicly , uh , here today . 41:46.954 --> 41:48.954 Um , Ms . Thompson , appreciate you 41:48.954 --> 41:51.177 being here again . Uh , I know the last 41:51.177 --> 41:53.066 time you were here I was a little 41:53.066 --> 41:55.010 frustrated that we weren't getting 41:55.010 --> 41:56.732 really many answers from you . 41:56.732 --> 41:59.010 Hopefully we can get some more answers . 41:59.010 --> 42:01.232 My line of questioning is similar to to 42:01.232 --> 42:00.780 what I asked you last time . I know 42:00.780 --> 42:02.947 it's been hit on by colleagues , but I 42:02.947 --> 42:05.169 wanna . Come back on it again . I wanna 42:05.169 --> 42:07.336 bring in uh what General Curlo said in 42:07.336 --> 42:09.224 his opening very powerfully in in 42:09.224 --> 42:11.336 speaking about both the risks and the 42:11.336 --> 42:13.558 tectonic shift but also the opportunity 42:13.558 --> 42:17.514 vis a vis Iran on its heels or arguably 42:17.844 --> 42:21.764 knees , uh , and , and our ability and 42:21.764 --> 42:24.284 opportunity to press , press press in 42:24.284 --> 42:26.479 that moment . And I'm trying to just 42:26.479 --> 42:28.800 wrestle with the the dissonance between 42:28.800 --> 42:31.679 that and some of the both appointees of 42:31.679 --> 42:33.679 this administration and some of the 42:33.679 --> 42:35.790 rhetoric of this administration , not 42:35.790 --> 42:37.790 so much you today in your testimony 42:37.790 --> 42:39.846 specifically , um , but I , I , I've 42:39.846 --> 42:42.080 pointed that this out before the dasD 42:42.080 --> 42:45.439 for the Middle East . Mr . Demino 42:46.229 --> 42:49.209 Has said deeply concerning things 42:49.209 --> 42:51.850 including that the Middle East does not 42:51.850 --> 42:55.250 really matter for US interests . That 42:55.250 --> 42:57.361 quote vital or existential threats in 42:57.361 --> 42:59.169 the Middle East are quote best 42:59.169 --> 43:02.169 characterized as minimal to nonexistent . 43:02.810 --> 43:04.866 He's also specifically characterized 43:04.866 --> 43:07.169 Iran's missile attacks on Israel as 43:07.169 --> 43:10.850 quote fairly moderate . I think General 43:10.850 --> 43:12.906 Killa , I'm not gonna put you on the 43:12.906 --> 43:15.072 spot , might disagree with that . He's 43:15.072 --> 43:16.906 vocally opposed attacking Iran's 43:16.906 --> 43:18.961 nuclear program described UX strikes 43:19.229 --> 43:21.340 against the Houthis as quote futile . 43:22.830 --> 43:25.520 Can you just explain to us ? I mean , I , 43:25.580 --> 43:28.169 I agree with what I've heard from , uh , 43:28.179 --> 43:30.290 General Corella and other experienced 43:30.290 --> 43:32.623 military leaders . We need to press the , 43:32.623 --> 43:34.735 the , the advantage we have vis a vis 43:34.735 --> 43:36.735 Iran and their proxies . How are we 43:36.735 --> 43:38.512 supposed to do that when senior 43:38.512 --> 43:40.623 appointees in the Pentagon are saying 43:40.623 --> 43:42.790 things like that ? Thank you for the , 43:42.790 --> 43:44.957 the question , Congressman . First and 43:44.957 --> 43:47.123 foremost , I , I will just note that I 43:47.123 --> 43:49.290 was not involved in , in the hiring of 43:49.290 --> 43:50.846 any officials , um , in the 43:50.846 --> 43:50.469 administration or the political . But 43:50.469 --> 43:52.580 you are here to speak on its behalf . 43:52.739 --> 43:54.850 So what I would say from the , yeah , 43:54.850 --> 43:56.850 from the , from the ISA perspective 43:56.850 --> 43:58.906 within the Undersecretary of Defense 43:58.906 --> 44:01.017 for Policy , I will make very clear , 44:01.017 --> 44:02.795 uh , we support the president's 44:02.795 --> 44:02.500 objective to not only first and 44:02.500 --> 44:04.611 foremost defend the state of Israel , 44:04.611 --> 44:06.667 but second , of course , deny Iran . 44:06.667 --> 44:08.944 The ability to obtain a nuclear weapon , 44:08.944 --> 44:11.167 that is something we are 100% committed 44:11.167 --> 44:13.056 to . And I will also note that we 44:13.056 --> 44:15.222 support the president's objectives and 44:15.222 --> 44:17.444 stand ready to provide military options 44:17.444 --> 44:20.235 should his strategy of pursuing peace 44:20.235 --> 44:22.457 with Iran through a negotiated solution 44:22.457 --> 44:24.346 and denying Iran a nuclear weapon 44:24.346 --> 44:26.291 through a negotiated solution . We 44:26.291 --> 44:26.004 stand ready as a department and within 44:26.004 --> 44:29.324 OSD policy to provide the secretary but 44:29.324 --> 44:31.268 how are you ready if you're not in 44:31.268 --> 44:33.491 agreement ? I mean , I can only speak . 44:33.491 --> 44:35.268 I should Mr . D'Amino be in the 44:35.268 --> 44:37.435 position then if he's not aligned with 44:37.435 --> 44:39.435 the president's intent ? That's not 44:39.435 --> 44:39.000 something that I can specifically speak 44:39.000 --> 44:41.590 to , but I can speak to for , for the 44:42.070 --> 44:44.600 international security , uh , the 44:44.600 --> 44:46.822 international security role that I play 44:46.822 --> 44:48.989 in the Department of Defense . This is 44:48.989 --> 44:48.840 what we are committed to working under 44:48.840 --> 44:51.062 Undersecretary Colby . Um , we are very 44:51.062 --> 44:53.284 much in line with Secretary Hegseth and 44:53.284 --> 44:55.451 Secretary and President Trump's , uh , 44:55.451 --> 44:57.507 guidance on this , and , and none of 44:57.507 --> 44:59.451 that has changed . Uh , might this 44:59.451 --> 45:01.673 dissonance explain for example why in , 45:01.673 --> 45:04.060 in the recent back and forth about , um , 45:04.070 --> 45:06.181 the , the , the negotiations which we 45:06.181 --> 45:08.360 all agree we want to happen . There's 45:08.360 --> 45:10.560 lack of clarity on level of enrichment 45:10.560 --> 45:12.439 that might be allowed within the 45:12.439 --> 45:14.550 administration signaling division and 45:14.550 --> 45:16.772 weakness to our adversaries . So that's 45:16.772 --> 45:18.717 not something I can speak to you . 45:18.717 --> 45:18.439 That's something that would be a 45:18.439 --> 45:20.606 question for Ambassador Witkoff's team 45:20.606 --> 45:22.661 at the State Department because they 45:22.661 --> 45:22.020 are the lead for negotiations . Ms . 45:22.040 --> 45:24.096 Thompson , I'll , I'll interrupt you 45:24.096 --> 45:26.262 again . I , I , I respect you . I know 45:26.262 --> 45:28.373 you have a hard job and I know you're 45:28.373 --> 45:30.429 performing the duties of if , if I'm 45:30.429 --> 45:32.540 saying that right , yes . Perform the 45:32.540 --> 45:34.040 duty of , um , but can the 45:34.040 --> 45:36.262 administration send us someone that can 45:36.262 --> 45:38.262 speak to these are pretty important 45:38.262 --> 45:40.040 questions . Can we , can we get 45:40.040 --> 45:42.096 somebody that can speak to these ? I 45:42.096 --> 45:44.262 would very much like to , to , to come 45:44.262 --> 45:46.318 and do a broad Iran briefing for you 45:46.318 --> 45:45.909 all if that would be something that's 45:45.909 --> 45:48.076 helpful , but I would respectfully ask 45:48.076 --> 45:50.131 that the State Department be present 45:50.131 --> 45:52.131 for that as well because Ambassador 45:52.131 --> 45:51.370 Witkoff's team as the lead for 45:51.370 --> 45:53.426 negotiations . Really would have the 45:53.426 --> 45:55.537 most recognized from South Carolina , 45:55.537 --> 45:59.290 Ms . May . Thank you , Mr . 45:59.449 --> 46:01.540 Chairman . Um , Iran's reckless 46:01.540 --> 46:03.429 behavior continues to threaten US 46:03.429 --> 46:05.373 forces , our allies , and regional 46:05.373 --> 46:07.373 stability . Its support for Hamas , 46:07.459 --> 46:09.610 Hezbollah , and the Houthis and other 46:09.610 --> 46:11.860 dangerous proxy groups continue to sow 46:11.860 --> 46:14.082 chaos throughout the Middle East , as I 46:14.082 --> 46:16.138 know you all are very familiar . Its 46:16.138 --> 46:17.860 support for proxy militias and 46:17.860 --> 46:19.971 terrorist threatens our interests and 46:19.971 --> 46:22.082 those of our allies while it advances 46:22.082 --> 46:24.082 in ballistic missile technology and 46:24.082 --> 46:26.249 pursuit of nuclear weapons threaten to 46:26.249 --> 46:28.527 plunge the region into greater turmoil . 46:28.527 --> 46:30.693 SENCOM's presence in the region deters 46:30.693 --> 46:32.749 aggression against our personnel and 46:32.749 --> 46:34.916 Middle Eastern allies . We must impose 46:34.916 --> 46:36.971 real costs on the Ayatollahs and the 46:36.971 --> 46:39.082 Iranian Revolutionary Guard to ensure 46:39.082 --> 46:41.304 that deterrence is fully restored . And 46:41.304 --> 46:43.582 Iran ceases its destructive activities . 46:43.582 --> 46:45.804 We must also send a clear message . Any 46:45.804 --> 46:47.916 advance toward Iran acquiring nuclear 46:47.916 --> 46:50.370 weapons is unacceptable to the United 46:50.370 --> 46:52.489 States . I commend President Trump's 46:52.489 --> 46:54.360 efforts to ensure Iran's nuclear 46:54.360 --> 46:56.649 program is fully dismantled . Nothing 46:56.649 --> 46:58.705 short of full dismantlement of their 46:58.705 --> 47:00.871 nuclear capabilities will ensure peace 47:00.871 --> 47:02.927 and stability in the region . So the 47:02.927 --> 47:05.093 Iranian regime has mastered the art of 47:05.093 --> 47:06.982 wielding proxy groups against its 47:06.982 --> 47:09.038 adversaries in the region repeatedly 47:09.038 --> 47:11.149 from Hamas , barbarism to Hezbollah's 47:11.149 --> 47:13.093 arsenals in Lebanon and the Houthi 47:13.093 --> 47:15.316 strikes in the Red Sea , Iran leverages 47:15.316 --> 47:17.538 its surrogates to strike our allies and 47:17.538 --> 47:19.371 harm our interests . So my first 47:19.371 --> 47:21.593 question today for General Korrilla can 47:21.593 --> 47:21.560 you briefly discuss the threat 47:21.560 --> 47:23.782 landscape you see from Iran , including 47:23.782 --> 47:25.949 the use of proxies ? So Iran basically 47:25.949 --> 47:28.100 has 3 . Pillars that they use . The 47:28.100 --> 47:30.689 first one is long range , um , weapons 47:30.689 --> 47:33.060 and and I access aerial denial . So 47:33.060 --> 47:35.469 think long range missiles , UAVs . Um , 47:35.479 --> 47:38.419 the second is their proxy networks . Um , 47:38.500 --> 47:40.669 the number one proxy they had was 47:40.669 --> 47:42.780 Lebanese Hezbollah , which acted as a 47:42.780 --> 47:44.947 bit of a sort of Damocles over the top 47:44.947 --> 47:47.169 of Israel . Israel's the doctrinal term 47:47.169 --> 47:49.225 disintegration of Lebanese Hezbollah 47:49.225 --> 47:51.447 should be studied by every military . I 47:51.447 --> 47:53.225 was recently there and saw that 47:53.225 --> 47:55.002 destruction and they did a very 47:55.002 --> 47:57.058 successful uh work . It was , it was 47:57.058 --> 47:59.280 brilliant , um , what they have done to 47:59.280 --> 48:01.447 Hamas , um , the Houthis were one that 48:01.447 --> 48:03.336 not a lot of people thought about 48:03.336 --> 48:05.502 before because at one point it was the 48:05.502 --> 48:07.558 lowest priority for intelligence . I 48:07.558 --> 48:06.939 think it is something that we have to 48:06.939 --> 48:08.949 pay a lot of attention to . I think 48:08.949 --> 48:10.949 what you're seeing with the Iranian 48:10.949 --> 48:13.171 aligned militia groups inside of Iraq , 48:13.171 --> 48:15.227 they used to be inside of Syria with 48:15.227 --> 48:17.449 the fall of Assad , um , that basically 48:17.449 --> 48:19.338 severed the Shia crescent , Qasem 48:19.338 --> 48:21.616 Soleimani , who he killed back in 2020 , 48:21.616 --> 48:23.671 he wanted to have this Shia crescent 48:23.671 --> 48:25.782 that ran from Iran to Iraq , Syria to 48:25.782 --> 48:27.782 Lebanon . The fall of Assad severed 48:27.782 --> 48:29.727 that . That is probably the single 48:29.727 --> 48:31.893 biggest event that has happened in the 48:31.893 --> 48:31.709 Middle East . And what's changed since 48:31.709 --> 48:34.149 October 7th ? I think what's changed 48:34.149 --> 48:36.038 since October 7th is Israel feels 48:36.038 --> 48:37.982 they're in an extential threat for 48:37.982 --> 48:39.927 their very existence with a lot of 48:39.927 --> 48:41.649 these Iranian proxies that are 48:41.649 --> 48:43.760 attacking them , and we had the first 48:43.760 --> 48:45.982 state on state um attacks blows between 48:45.982 --> 48:48.205 the two countries . Um , Iran has in is 48:48.205 --> 48:50.316 a weaker strategic position . They've 48:50.316 --> 48:52.427 lost a lot . Of their proxies , their 48:52.427 --> 48:54.649 air defense network is not what it used 48:54.649 --> 48:56.871 to be . However , they still have a lot 48:56.871 --> 48:58.982 of operational capability in terms of 48:58.982 --> 48:58.824 their long range weapons at the 48:58.824 --> 49:01.046 classified session , um , I can talk in 49:01.046 --> 49:03.102 great detail their capabilities . Do 49:03.102 --> 49:05.213 you have any concern about , uh , the 49:05.213 --> 49:07.213 Houthis and their relationship with 49:07.213 --> 49:09.213 Saudi Arabia ? The the relationship 49:09.213 --> 49:11.435 with Saudi Arabia , no , I don't have . 49:11.435 --> 49:13.657 I mean , Saudi Arabia , um , has been a 49:13.657 --> 49:15.824 strong supporter of what we were doing 49:15.824 --> 49:18.157 in Operation . Yes , they have , but we , 49:18.157 --> 49:17.500 you know , my understanding is we 49:17.500 --> 49:19.611 designate the Houthis , for example , 49:19.611 --> 49:21.278 is not the top tier terrorist 49:21.278 --> 49:23.278 organization . They're on the lower 49:23.278 --> 49:25.500 rung of designation , is that correct ? 49:25.500 --> 49:25.500 They they were ma'am . They were 49:25.500 --> 49:27.667 firstly specially designated terrorist 49:27.667 --> 49:29.778 group and then we made them a foreign 49:29.778 --> 49:31.500 terrorist organization . Under 49:31.500 --> 49:33.722 President Trump , so they're at the top 49:33.722 --> 49:32.770 level . They're at the top level now , 49:32.810 --> 49:35.032 which is something I advocated for when 49:35.032 --> 49:36.921 Biden was president and it didn't 49:36.921 --> 49:39.088 happen , um , which means , uh , there 49:39.088 --> 49:41.254 are consequences to that in the Middle 49:41.254 --> 49:43.254 East , which is good for the United 49:43.254 --> 49:45.366 States and our allies overseas . Um , 49:45.366 --> 49:48.489 has the , uh . Has the degradation of 49:48.489 --> 49:50.378 Iran's proxy network affected its 49:50.378 --> 49:52.850 ability to destabilize the region ? So 49:52.850 --> 49:54.961 the , the , the one challenge we have 49:54.961 --> 49:58.040 with Iran , they get petro dollars 49:58.040 --> 50:01.449 90% , 85% to 90% of their oil is 50:01.449 --> 50:03.929 purchased by China . So China is 50:03.929 --> 50:06.159 effectively supporting and financing 50:06.159 --> 50:08.610 Iran's malign behavior . We still see 50:08.610 --> 50:10.721 the amount of funds that are going to 50:10.721 --> 50:12.832 the IRGCUS force that is who runs the 50:12.832 --> 50:16.010 proxy networks outside of Iran . So as 50:16.010 --> 50:18.810 we look at the sanctioned oil , um , I 50:18.810 --> 50:20.754 think for the first time the State 50:20.754 --> 50:22.866 Department sanctioned what are called 50:22.866 --> 50:24.754 the teapot refineries . These are 50:24.754 --> 50:26.977 refineries along the Chinese coast that 50:26.977 --> 50:26.840 these ships take this sanctioned oil . 50:26.929 --> 50:29.560 Iran , this is 10% of all Chinese oil 50:29.850 --> 50:32.239 they get they import 70% , 50% goes to 50:32.239 --> 50:35.020 the Strait of Hormuz , but it's 85% to 50:35.020 --> 50:37.610 90% from Iran . It goes into these 50:37.610 --> 50:39.850 teapot refineries , um , and I think 50:39.850 --> 50:42.072 the first time we've ever done is we've 50:42.072 --> 50:43.794 sanctioned one of those teapot 50:43.794 --> 50:43.120 refineries . Uh , last question , 50:43.250 --> 50:46.179 thoughts on Qatar . I am we have a very 50:46.179 --> 50:47.957 strong relationship military to 50:47.957 --> 50:50.012 military . Last base there they fund 50:50.012 --> 50:52.012 the base . They do burden sharing . 50:52.060 --> 50:54.171 When I ask them a question , they say 50:54.171 --> 50:55.949 the answer is yes . What is the 50:55.949 --> 50:58.116 question ? OK , Mr . Chairman , I yell 50:58.116 --> 51:00.171 back . Thank you . yields back . She 51:00.171 --> 50:59.969 and I recognize the gentle lady from 50:59.969 --> 51:03.189 Pennsylvania , Ms . Huan . Thank you , 51:03.239 --> 51:05.350 uh , Mr . Chair , and that's what you 51:05.350 --> 51:07.517 get for being late to the gavel . um , 51:07.520 --> 51:09.464 I really appreciate your service , 51:09.464 --> 51:11.576 General and general thank you so much 51:11.576 --> 51:13.798 for your , um , amazing careers and for 51:13.798 --> 51:15.798 the opportunity to speak with you . 51:15.798 --> 51:18.020 Most questions have been asked , so I'm 51:18.020 --> 51:17.840 gonna ask the one that I have that 51:17.840 --> 51:20.173 hasn't yet been asked . General Langley , 51:20.173 --> 51:22.284 you spoke a lot about what's going on 51:22.284 --> 51:24.340 in Africa . And the fact that you've 51:24.340 --> 51:26.284 had a conversation with our , uh , 51:26.284 --> 51:28.173 partners and allies and that they 51:28.173 --> 51:30.340 understand , uh , and are embracing in 51:30.340 --> 51:32.451 your I think words um their new roles 51:32.451 --> 51:34.507 and responsibilities . I'd like to , 51:34.507 --> 51:36.618 I'd like to believe that and so let's 51:36.618 --> 51:38.618 say that that's true because I hear 51:38.618 --> 51:40.729 that a lot from all of Europe as well 51:40.729 --> 51:42.951 about Europe and and Ukraine . Assuming 51:42.951 --> 51:44.951 that is true , can you describe how 51:44.951 --> 51:47.379 AFRO is operationalizing that process 51:47.379 --> 51:49.490 of transitioning the responsibilities 51:49.490 --> 51:51.712 and rolls over to our allies and to our 51:51.712 --> 51:53.823 partners , and can you also explain , 51:53.823 --> 51:55.990 and this is for both of you all , um , 51:55.990 --> 51:58.101 how you would measure or what sort of 51:58.101 --> 52:00.323 metrics or benchmarks you would have to 52:00.323 --> 52:02.379 know whether or not our partners are 52:02.379 --> 52:04.490 indeed transitioning and are really . 52:04.490 --> 52:06.546 Truly prepared to be able to take on 52:06.546 --> 52:08.768 this sort of operational responsibility 52:08.768 --> 52:10.935 that's my only question so I'd love it 52:10.935 --> 52:10.685 if you would give it some real thought 52:10.975 --> 52:13.142 because it's really , really important 52:13.142 --> 52:15.308 that if we assume that these folks can 52:15.308 --> 52:17.475 or are interested in doing this , that 52:17.475 --> 52:19.197 we have performance metrics or 52:19.197 --> 52:21.253 standards that we're looking for and 52:21.253 --> 52:21.014 that we also have an operational plan 52:21.014 --> 52:22.847 that we have to transition those 52:22.847 --> 52:25.659 responsibilities over . Congressman , 52:25.850 --> 52:27.906 grateful , uh , I'm grateful for the 52:27.906 --> 52:30.072 question . I know we last spoke , um , 52:30.072 --> 52:32.294 we're at Munich Security Conference and 52:32.294 --> 52:34.572 we were in the throes of the , uh , uh , 52:34.572 --> 52:37.169 Title 22 , uh , pause and then at the 52:37.169 --> 52:39.520 forefront of the Title 10 review . Uh , 52:39.649 --> 52:41.489 so at ARCO what we had to do is 52:41.489 --> 52:44.370 reassess where we were and , and try to 52:44.610 --> 52:46.777 do some , uh , predictive analytics on 52:46.777 --> 52:48.888 what the effects would be . Uh , this 52:48.888 --> 52:51.000 is all . In parallel with uh 52:51.000 --> 52:52.722 structuring our narrative , or 52:52.722 --> 52:54.833 structuring our narrative of going to 52:54.833 --> 52:57.167 our partners , uh , going to our allies , 52:57.320 --> 52:59.719 and , and , and come up with straight 52:59.719 --> 53:03.600 talk of what it really means of a 53:03.600 --> 53:07.209 shared burden for the , for the sake of 53:07.209 --> 53:09.431 stability and security on the continent 53:09.431 --> 53:13.429 of Africa . So I did uh uh further 53:13.429 --> 53:15.949 I did meet with the , uh , uh , the 53:15.949 --> 53:17.790 NATO rep uh for the southern 53:17.790 --> 53:19.957 neighborhood as they call it they call 53:19.957 --> 53:22.123 it SNAP and I shared that with him . I 53:22.123 --> 53:23.901 said , uh , you know , uh , our 53:23.901 --> 53:25.957 government , uh , uh , we are all in 53:25.957 --> 53:27.846 for stability and security across 53:27.846 --> 53:29.790 Africa , uh , but we need to share 53:29.790 --> 53:31.790 commitment from you because this is 53:31.790 --> 53:34.068 your , your southern neighborhood . uh , 53:34.068 --> 53:36.123 what happens , uh , as far as . Mass 53:36.123 --> 53:37.846 migration or or a migration of 53:37.846 --> 53:39.901 terrorists uh that can threaten your 53:39.901 --> 53:43.179 neighborhood uh your your borders uh is 53:43.179 --> 53:45.179 our same concern with our southwest 53:45.179 --> 53:48.530 border uh so that uh soaked in well , 53:48.780 --> 53:51.100 uh , with our African partners , uh , a 53:51.100 --> 53:53.156 shared commitment they say well it's 53:53.156 --> 53:55.659 gonna take a little time and uh also 53:55.659 --> 53:58.010 we're going to uh diversify our 53:58.010 --> 54:00.177 partners . Uh , so we get that as long 54:00.177 --> 54:02.399 as we have those shared objectives , as 54:02.399 --> 54:04.566 long as we have those shared values to 54:04.566 --> 54:06.649 reach that end state . So in Nairobi 54:06.649 --> 54:08.969 last week , um , I collected we got 54:08.969 --> 54:11.080 with the chiefs of defense and said , 54:11.080 --> 54:13.080 hey , you know , uh , their biggest 54:13.080 --> 54:15.302 message to me , hey , we're not looking 54:15.302 --> 54:17.191 to be saved . We can , we can hit 54:17.191 --> 54:19.136 stability and like and when you're 54:19.136 --> 54:21.302 talking about , you know , a narrative 54:21.302 --> 54:23.636 narratives don't get it done , you know . 54:23.636 --> 54:25.358 What is the plan ? What is the 54:25.358 --> 54:27.247 operational plan that we all have 54:27.247 --> 54:28.747 collectively , uh , on our 54:28.747 --> 54:30.969 responsibility to hand that over and on 54:30.969 --> 54:32.969 our ability to measure whether it's 54:32.969 --> 54:35.191 actually been handed over with any sort 54:35.191 --> 54:37.302 of uh security or safety or assurance 54:37.302 --> 54:39.413 that we that it will be consistent to 54:39.413 --> 54:41.525 the standards that we have always put 54:41.525 --> 54:43.525 to the region . And Congresswoman , 54:43.525 --> 54:45.747 I'll just tell you the plan is theirs . 54:45.747 --> 54:45.479 uh , you know , every country is 54:45.479 --> 54:48.189 different . Uh , we don't push 54:48.189 --> 54:50.189 ourselves , uh , to invade on their 54:50.189 --> 54:52.689 sovereignty . Uh , uh , every , every 54:52.689 --> 54:54.689 country is coming up with their own 54:54.689 --> 54:56.800 plan . That was their takeaway , um , 54:56.800 --> 54:58.856 but they also know that , uh , the , 54:58.856 --> 55:00.633 that the militaries , all these 55:00.633 --> 55:02.856 military leads know that they're giving 55:02.856 --> 55:04.967 their best military advice , uh , for 55:04.967 --> 55:06.800 the enduring solution from their 55:06.800 --> 55:09.022 layered threats . One of them be , uh , 55:09.022 --> 55:11.133 that's that's a shared threat of ours 55:11.133 --> 55:13.520 is , uh , is terrorism . So there lies 55:13.520 --> 55:15.889 their ability and , and their 55:15.889 --> 55:17.945 responsibility to come up with their 55:17.945 --> 55:20.056 own plans . I'm seeing it different , 55:20.056 --> 55:22.222 uh , from coast to West Africa all the 55:22.222 --> 55:24.056 way to Somalia . They all have a 55:24.056 --> 55:26.222 different approach . I have to respect 55:26.222 --> 55:28.389 that , uh , and how we then we then we 55:28.389 --> 55:30.500 decide , uh , uh , you know , then we 55:30.500 --> 55:32.611 go through our Title 10 , uh Title 10 55:32.611 --> 55:34.778 review and , uh , we double down based 55:34.778 --> 55:36.889 on the empirical data what has worked 55:36.889 --> 55:38.945 in the past . And what didn't work , 55:38.945 --> 55:40.854 what did work on those strategies 55:40.854 --> 55:43.076 together , or do you just walk away and 55:43.076 --> 55:45.243 say everybody's got their own plan and 55:45.243 --> 55:47.410 it looks like to be , to excuse me , a 55:47.410 --> 55:49.521 bunch of Democrats , you know , we're 55:49.521 --> 55:49.495 all gonna have a different plan . You 55:49.495 --> 55:51.551 don't want that . You want people to 55:51.551 --> 55:53.717 figure out how to work together and us 55:53.717 --> 55:55.735 walking away from this is is 55:55.735 --> 55:57.902 irresponsible unless we feel as though 55:57.902 --> 56:00.013 we're walking away with a plan that's 56:00.013 --> 56:01.791 unified and not just individual 56:01.791 --> 56:03.939 sovereignty . Am I making sense ? I 56:03.939 --> 56:07.379 recognize from Virginia , Mr . Whitman . 56:08.540 --> 56:10.540 Thank you Mr . Chairman I'd like to 56:10.540 --> 56:12.873 thank our witnesses for joining us , Ms . 56:12.873 --> 56:12.100 Thompson , General Carrilla , General 56:12.100 --> 56:14.156 Langley , thank you so much for your 56:14.156 --> 56:16.211 service . Thanks for all you've done 56:16.211 --> 56:18.433 for our nation . I want to try to maybe 56:18.433 --> 56:20.590 draw a line amongst a number of 56:20.590 --> 56:22.479 different issues that you all are 56:22.479 --> 56:24.646 dealing with . I really think that the 56:24.646 --> 56:26.757 combatant commands being there on the 56:26.757 --> 56:28.701 front lines probably have the best 56:28.701 --> 56:31.090 assessment and understanding of the 56:31.090 --> 56:33.439 threat and the timeliness of the threat 56:33.810 --> 56:36.032 and then how that needs to be expressed 56:36.032 --> 56:38.310 in the assets that we need in order to . 56:38.310 --> 56:40.421 Counter that threat . I mean , we see 56:40.421 --> 56:42.421 our exquisite assets , the ones you 56:42.421 --> 56:44.679 have in theater , General Carrillo , 56:44.969 --> 56:47.025 General Langley , you see where we , 56:47.025 --> 56:49.247 you know , we pull the Carl Vinson from 56:49.247 --> 56:51.302 the East China Sea . We extended the 56:51.302 --> 56:53.413 deployment of the Harry Truman , uh , 56:53.413 --> 56:55.636 General Langley , you know that when we 56:55.636 --> 56:58.520 had , um , we had needs there in Africa , 56:58.610 --> 57:01.060 whether it's places like Sudan , 57:01.580 --> 57:04.409 Morocco , uh , even , even some of the 57:04.409 --> 57:07.159 other events there in the Red Sea . We 57:07.159 --> 57:09.439 see the demand signal go up and then 57:09.439 --> 57:11.919 when we'd like to have a crisis 57:11.919 --> 57:14.320 response team in an RCU we don't have 57:14.320 --> 57:16.439 it or we have to move other assets 57:16.439 --> 57:18.550 around . General Carrillo , you spoke 57:18.550 --> 57:21.000 at length about the building threat 57:21.000 --> 57:24.000 from one-way attack drones , and all 57:24.000 --> 57:26.222 you have to do is to look at the aerial 57:26.222 --> 57:28.222 photographs of the runways there in 57:28.222 --> 57:30.600 Russia and ask the Russians about the 57:30.600 --> 57:32.679 impact of one-way attack drones and 57:32.679 --> 57:34.790 give the give the Ukrainians credit . 57:35.070 --> 57:36.959 But the thing that concerns me is 57:36.959 --> 57:39.126 that's a scenario that can play in the 57:39.126 --> 57:41.439 opposite direction today and tomorrow , 57:41.840 --> 57:43.939 and I just don't believe we have the 57:43.939 --> 57:47.540 counter UAS capability that we need . I 57:47.540 --> 57:49.651 want your perspective because I think 57:49.651 --> 57:51.596 that the cocoms are closest to the 57:51.596 --> 57:55.189 threat and if you were tomorrow to say 57:55.189 --> 57:58.550 these are the things that I need . That 57:58.550 --> 58:02.229 I can operationalize quickly . Well I 58:02.229 --> 58:04.229 love our exquisite platforms and we 58:04.229 --> 58:06.173 need them , but they're not coming 58:06.173 --> 58:07.896 quickly and they're not coming 58:07.896 --> 58:09.896 inexpensively but there are lots of 58:09.896 --> 58:11.840 opportunities with expendables and 58:11.840 --> 58:14.007 tradables . Give me your perspective . 58:14.007 --> 58:16.007 If you could give us on your eupher 58:16.007 --> 58:18.118 list , if you could say today , today 58:18.118 --> 58:20.285 my top priorities is on the euh list , 58:20.285 --> 58:22.285 the way you see the threat as it is 58:22.285 --> 58:24.285 today , both of you , what would be 58:24.285 --> 58:26.550 your top 5 priorities to make sure this 58:26.550 --> 58:30.439 nation gives you at least a . Part of 58:30.439 --> 58:32.495 the tool set that you need , part of 58:32.495 --> 58:34.661 the kit that you would need to counter 58:34.661 --> 58:36.717 what you see and how it changes on a 58:36.717 --> 58:39.050 daily basis . So the greatest risk , uh , 58:39.050 --> 58:41.106 congressman in the SENCOM AOR is the 58:41.106 --> 58:43.217 unmanned aerial systems and ballistic 58:43.217 --> 58:45.439 missiles . So it would be in the detect 58:45.439 --> 58:47.383 and kill of counter UAS to include 58:47.383 --> 58:49.161 swarms large numbers . You need 58:49.161 --> 58:51.217 magazine depth , um , and then in in 58:51.217 --> 58:53.272 terms of our air defense assets that 58:53.272 --> 58:55.383 are forward . Deployed you have to be 58:55.383 --> 58:57.550 able to protect those from counter UAS 58:57.550 --> 58:59.661 as well . We need to be very mobile . 58:59.661 --> 58:59.449 We need to be able to integrate them 58:59.449 --> 59:01.560 into the systems . When I took over 3 59:01.560 --> 59:03.560 years ago , if I walked into a base 59:03.560 --> 59:05.505 defense operations center , that's 59:05.505 --> 59:07.393 where they do all the command and 59:07.393 --> 59:09.338 control for the base to be able to 59:09.338 --> 59:11.338 defend against drones , you'd see 5 59:11.338 --> 59:13.560 systems , 5 screens , 5 operators . Now 59:13.560 --> 59:15.671 when you walk in , we've been able to 59:15.671 --> 59:17.893 integrate that into maybe 2 screens and 59:17.893 --> 59:19.838 2 . Operators , but you have now 7 59:19.838 --> 59:22.005 systems uh integrated into there so we 59:22.005 --> 59:24.282 need to really do better at the detect . 59:24.282 --> 59:26.393 It's we're only gonna see the systems 59:26.393 --> 59:28.227 get smaller , more lethal , um , 59:28.227 --> 59:30.449 electronic magnetic information , the , 59:30.449 --> 59:32.505 the electromagnetic spectrum when we 59:32.505 --> 59:34.393 try and jam them . That's why the 59:34.393 --> 59:36.616 Ukraine and Russia went to fiber optics 59:36.616 --> 59:38.616 going out to 40 kilometers of fiber 59:38.616 --> 59:40.893 optic drones , um , you can't jam that . 59:40.893 --> 59:42.893 So those are the things I would ask 59:42.893 --> 59:45.116 right now is the counter UAS detect . I 59:45.116 --> 59:47.282 think we need to put aerial , uh , ISA 59:47.282 --> 59:49.393 radars for low radar cross section to 59:49.393 --> 59:51.560 be able to pick up elevated , um , and 59:51.560 --> 59:53.282 then ballistic missile defense 59:53.282 --> 59:55.505 ballistic missile defense . Yes , thank 59:55.505 --> 59:57.505 you . I think my top 3 is about the 59:57.505 --> 59:59.439 same as Eric Carrillo County UAS 59:59.439 --> 01:00:01.606 integrated air missile defense , and , 01:00:01.649 --> 01:00:03.705 uh , but I was gonna add uh sense to 01:00:03.705 --> 01:00:05.929 make sense ISR . I'm at a deficit for 01:00:05.929 --> 01:00:08.489 ISR across uh , across the continent 01:00:08.489 --> 01:00:10.330 for emanating threats match 01:00:10.330 --> 01:00:12.386 capabilities to the threats . That's 01:00:12.386 --> 01:00:14.497 what Secretary He told me to do , and 01:00:14.497 --> 01:00:16.608 that's what I'm requesting , uh , but 01:00:16.608 --> 01:00:18.663 just go further down the list , uh , 01:00:18.663 --> 01:00:21.209 maritime capability , uh , like I said , 01:00:21.290 --> 01:00:23.457 I , I , I've said it already , but I'm 01:00:23.457 --> 01:00:25.401 just gonna bang the drum . Uh , we 01:00:25.401 --> 01:00:27.234 missed you . Arg , we missed the 01:00:27.234 --> 01:00:29.346 amphibious readiness group , uh , the 01:00:29.346 --> 01:00:31.679 Marine Expedition units , they're ready , 01:00:31.679 --> 01:00:33.734 but they're sitting on the , they're 01:00:33.734 --> 01:00:33.673 sitting on the shore , uh , but we need 01:00:33.673 --> 01:00:35.729 to fix the , the ship problem , uh , 01:00:35.729 --> 01:00:37.992 you know , as cars that , that the 3 , 01:00:38.103 --> 01:00:40.712 ship , uh , arg is what's needed . We 01:00:40.712 --> 01:00:42.601 can't do heel to toe anymore . It 01:00:42.601 --> 01:00:45.032 sometimes we're not even 1.0 . Uh , we 01:00:45.032 --> 01:00:47.088 need to get back there . I talked to 01:00:47.088 --> 01:00:49.199 the vice CNO the other day and , uh , 01:00:49.199 --> 01:00:51.310 he gets it , as well as I talked to , 01:00:51.310 --> 01:00:53.593 uh , the the Marine Corps . Uh , we 01:00:53.593 --> 01:00:56.696 missed that in the . AFRO , uh , AOR , 01:00:56.815 --> 01:00:58.926 you know , from crisis response , and 01:00:58.926 --> 01:01:01.093 we need that sea base forward . You're 01:01:01.093 --> 01:01:03.148 right , uh , Congressman , we really 01:01:03.148 --> 01:01:05.315 did need that , uh , and , uh , when , 01:01:05.315 --> 01:01:07.593 uh , uh , Amedi , uh , was going at it , 01:01:07.593 --> 01:01:10.605 uh , with Burhan , uh , in , in Sudan , 01:01:10.696 --> 01:01:12.807 we really needed that offshore , uh , 01:01:12.807 --> 01:01:15.140 to utilize that . So and then also , uh , 01:01:15.140 --> 01:01:17.307 for a force deterrent , it's a show of 01:01:17.307 --> 01:01:19.645 a show of power to contend with , uh , 01:01:19.656 --> 01:01:21.823 the , uh , the net up that the Chinese 01:01:21.823 --> 01:01:23.878 is going around the periphery of the 01:01:23.878 --> 01:01:26.045 continent . Very good . Thank you Mr . 01:01:26.045 --> 01:01:25.750 Chairman . You're back . Jim , it's 01:01:25.750 --> 01:01:27.806 time to expired . This will conclude 01:01:27.806 --> 01:01:29.861 the open portion of our hearing . We 01:01:29.861 --> 01:01:32.270 will reconvene in 10 minutes at 12:40 01:01:32.270 --> 01:01:35.629 in room 2212 for the classified portion .